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ABSTRACT 
                                              
 The hot topic in corporate governance is the debate over corporate 
purpose and, in particular, whether corporations should shift their purpose from 
the pursuit of shareholder wealth to pursuing a broader conception of 
stakeholder or societal value.  We argue that this debate has overlooked the 
critical predicate questions of whether a corporation should have a purpose at 
all and, if so, why,   
 
 We address these questions by examining the historical, legal and 
theoretical justifications for corporate purpose.  We find that none of the three 
provides a basis for requiring a corporation to articulate a particular purpose 
or for a given normative conception of what that purpose should be.  We 
additionally challenge recent corporate commitments to stakeholder value as 
lacking both binding legal effect and operational significance.  . 
 
 We nonetheless argue that articulating a corporate purpose can be 
valuable, and we justify a specification of corporate purpose on instrumental 
grounds.  Because a corporation consists of a variety of constituencies with 
differing interests and objectives, an articulated corporate purpose enables 
those constituencies both to select those corporations with which they wish to 
identify and to navigate the terms of that association through contract or 
regulation.  Our instrumental view of the corporation brings a new perspective 
to the purpose debate.  Although we do not address competing normative claims 
about what a corporation’s purpose should be, our instrumental argument leads 
us to conclude that, at least as a default matter, the purpose of a corporation 
should be understood as maximizing the economic value of the firm.   
 
 
 
 Jill E. Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University 
of Pennsylvania School of Law; Steven Davidoff Solomon is Professor of Law at the 
University of California Berkeley, School of Law. We thank participants at workshops at 
Duke University School of Law, the University of Pennsylvania School of Law, and [] for 
their helpful comments and suggestions. 
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There’s a shift going on. When I went to U.S.C., it was all about maximizing 
value for shareholders. But we’re moving into a world of stakeholders. It’s not 
just about shareholders. Your employees are stakeholders, so are your 
customers, your partners, the communities that you’re in, the homeless that are 
nearby, your public schools. 
 
--Mark Benioff, CEO, Chairman of the Board, Salesforce, Inc.1 
 
Everyone else has a purpose.  So what’s mine? 
 
-- Purpose, Avenue Q 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Purpose is currently the hottest topic in corporate governance.   Not only 
are commentators demanding that corporations formally articulate a purpose, 
they are insisting that corporate purpose encompass the interests of non-
shareholder stakeholders or society more generally.2  In August 2019, the 
Business Roundtable made international headlines3 when it issued a new 
statement on the purpose of the corporation which replaced its former support 
for shareholder primacy with the proposition that corporations be run for the 
benefit of all stakeholders – customers, employees, suppliers, communities and 
shareholders.”4   In November 2019, the British Academy published a report 
proposing a new formula for corporate purpose – “the purpose of business is to 
profitably solve problems of people and planet, and not profit from causing 
problems.”5  Blackrock CEO Larry Fink has stated that “[w]ithout a sense of 
 
1 Interview with Mark Benioff, USC Start-up News, Jun. 15, 2018, available at 
https://incubate.usc.edu/marc-benioff-of-salesforce-are-we-not-all-connected/ 
2 Commentators have used the term “stakeholder” in various ways.  We distinguish in this 
Article between those who have direct relationships with a corporation, such as creditors, 
employees and suppliers, and others who are arguably affected by corporate decisions, 
referring to the latter interests as societal interests. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto 
Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, https://ssrn.com/abstract-
3544978 (2020) (exploring variation in the use of the term stakeholder). 
3 See, e.g., Jim Ludema & Amber Johnson, The Purpose Of The Corporation? Business 
Roundtable Advances The Conversation, Now We All Need To Contribute, FORBES, Aug. 20, 
2019, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/amberjohnson-jimludema/2019/08/20/the-
purpose-of-the-corporation/#25c6fd5b3846; Group of US corporate leaders ditch 
shareholder first mantra, THE FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2019, available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/e21a9fac-c1f5-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9 
4 See Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to 
Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, Aug. 19, 2019, available at 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-
corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans;   
5 The British Academy proposes principles for the age of purposeful business, Nov. 27, 
2019, available at  https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/news/british-academy-proposes-
principles-age-purposeful-business 
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purpose, no company, either public or private, can achieve its full potential.”6  
And the new Restatement of Corporate Governance, a project of the American 
Law Institute, has proposed that the statement on the objectives of the 
corporation from predecessor Principles of Corporate Governance be “modified 
substantially.”7 
 
 The shift is more than semantic.  The debate over corporate purpose is 
part of a broader effort to reorient corporate decision-making away from 
economic value maximization in favor of broader societal objectives, not simply 
as a choice, but as an affirmative obligation.  The Davos Manifesto seeks to 
mandate that all corporations have the purpose of creating value for the benefit 
of all their stakeholders.8  Senator Elizabeth Warren has introduced legislation 
which would require corporations to be run for the benefit of constituencies with 
mandatory employee representation on the board.9 Around the world, 
commentators are arguing that corporations should be redirected towards an 
environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) oriented purpose.10 And 
corporations themselves are increasingly laying claim to constituency-minded 
or social purposes.11  At the extreme, some commentators suggest that 
 
6 Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs, A Sense of Purpose, available at 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter 
7 See Edward B. Rock, Memorandum to The Advisers and Members of Consultative Group, 
draft Jan. 13, 2020.   
8 See World Economic Forum Davos Manifesto 2020 (“The purpose of a company is to 
engage all its stakeholders in shared and sustained value creation.  In creating such value, a 
company serves not only its shareholders, but all its stakeholders – employees, customers, 
suppliers, local communities and society at large.”). 
9  Accountable Capitalism Act, 115th Congress (2017-2018) S. 3348.  See also Elizabeth 
Warren, Companies Shouldn’t be Accountable Only to Shareholders, THE WALL ST. J., Aug. 
14, 2018 (outlining the parameters of her legislative proposal and stating her act would 
“require corporate directors to consider the interests of all major corporate stakeholders—
not only shareholders—in company decisions.”). 
10 Other countries including the UK and the European Union have been even more 
aggressive and is moving toward a stewardship model with many stewardship codes 
explicitly specifying social as well as economic objectives.  See FCLT Global, Harnessing 
Stewardship Codes for Long Term Value Creation, available at 
https://www.fcltglobal.org/research/tools/stewardship-codes (“Twenty-four stewardship 
codes have been introduced around the world, mostly since 2016.”). 
11 See, e.g., Benioff Interview, supra note 1; Nestle S.A., Our Purpose (“Our purpose 
Enhancing quality of life and contributing to a healthier future. Driven by our purpose we 
want to help shape a better world and inspire people to live healthier lives. This is how we 
contribute to society and ensure our long-term success.”), available at 
https://www.nestle.com/aboutus.  See generally Omar Rodríguez ViláSundar Bharadwaj, 
Competing on Social Purpose, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Sept.-Oct. 2017) (“Consumers 
increasingly expect brands to have not just functional benefits but a social purpose. As a 
result, companies are taking social stands in very visible ways.”) 
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corporations should be encouraged to make decisions that deliberately sacrifice 
economic value in favor of the public interest.12 
 
  These arguments run counter to the traditional view that corporations 
should be managed with the primary goal of pursuing economic value for 
shareholders, often referred to as shareholder primacy.  Although commentators 
widely agree that shareholder primacy affords officers and directors substantial 
latitude to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, and indeed 
that principle is formalized in many areas of corporate law such as the business 
judgment rule, statutes authorizing corporations to donate money to charity, and, 
in many states, constituency statutes, the new discussion calls for corporations 
to shift their primary objective to a public purpose.13  In advocating this shift, 
commentators identify several justifications, including the claims that (a) by 
focusing on short-term profit maximization, corporations are inflicting 
substantial external harm on non-shareholder groups, (b) such behavior is a 
misuse of the state-conferred privileges associated with the use of the corporate 
form, and (c) repurposing large corporations offer the only practical solution to 
persistent regulatory failures in addressing societal problems such as wealth 
inequality and climate change. 
 
  In this Article we address the fundamental issue of corporate purpose.  
We do so by reframing the argument.  More specifically, arguments today about 
the purpose of the corporation do not address the key predicate questions: what 
it means for a corporation to have a purpose, whether corporations should have 
a purpose at all and, if so, why. We believe that only by answering these 
questions can we lay a theoretical framework for further defining the aims, goals 
and regulation of the corporation.  
 
  The technical concept of corporate purpose has its roots in the statutory 
requirement that corporations articulate in their charter the purpose for which 
they are formed.  This requirement goes back to the time of special purpose 
charters, which were drafted to meet statutory limitations on the use of the 
corporate form.14  The specification of a corporation’s purpose in its charter 
operated as a legally enforceable constraint on corporate operations.  Actions by 
 
12 See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, Making Corporate Social Responsibility Pay, at 3. (“The 
difficult question, however, is how to encourage corporations to make public interested 
choices that are bad for business, or at least, not clearly good.”).  See also Einer Elhauge 
Sacrificing Corporate Profits In The Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 733, 738 (2005) 
(“Corporate managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize corporate 
profits. Rather, they have always had some legal discretion (implicit or explicit) to sacrifice 
corporate profits in the public interest.”) 
13 We discuss this further infra at notes []-[] and accompanying text.  
14 See infra notes []-[] and accompanying text.  
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the corporation that exceeded the scope of its charter could be attacked as ultra 
vires.15    
 
  Modern corporation statutes eliminated the restrictions on the use of the 
corporate form.  These statutes also did not specify or limit the permissible 
purposes for which a corporation may be formed so long as those purposes are 
“lawful.”16  As a result, most modern corporate charters contain a generic 
statement that the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful activity.  
The DowDuPont charter illustrates the typical formulation: 
 
The purpose of the Company is to engage in any lawful act or 
activity for which a corporation may now or hereafter be 
organized under the General Corporation Law of the State of 
Delaware.17 
 
  This formulation neither explicitly endorses a for-profit purpose nor 
imposes any meaningful guidelines on managerial decision-making.  At the 
same time, the statutes do not appear to restrict charter provisions that either 
endorse or reject a shareholder profit maximization norm.  As such, the statutory 
requirement raises the first question implicated by the debate over corporate 
purpose – are those advocating a reform to corporate purpose proposing that 
corporations amend their charters and, if so how?  Assuming that charter 
provisions articulating a purpose weighted towards societal interests are 
permitted by existing statutory law (and we believe they are), would they be 
prudent, and would they have any legal effect on corporate actions? 
 
  As we detail below, we doubt that proponents of a shift in corporate 
purpose are contemplating broad-based charter amendments.  Among the 
concerns raised by such an approach is the manner by which a corporation would 
articulate a move away from shareholder primacy to stakeholder value through 
a charter provision, the process by which corporations would implement this 
new purpose and whether the corporation is structured appropriately under 
current statutory law to implement this purpose.18  Indeed, although we believe 
 
15 We discuss this further infra at notes []-[] and accompanying text.  
16 See Delaware General Corporate Law § 102(a) (“The certificate of incorporation shall set 
forth (3) The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or pursued.  It shall be 
sufficient to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the 
corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be 
organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware . . . .”) 
17 Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of DowDupont Inc., available 
at https://s23.q4cdn.com/116192123/files/doc_governance/2019/05/DD_-
_Certificate_of_Incorporation-(003).pdf 
18 There are also technical issues such as whether appraisal rights would be available to 
dissenting shareholders if a corporation amended its charter to shift from shareholder 
primacy to stakeholder value.  Delaware, for example, provides dissenting shareholders with 
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that the pursuit of stakeholder and societal interest can be reflected in the 
purpose provisions of traditional for-profit corporations (as opposed to public 
benefit corporations), few corporations contain any language in their charters 
reflecting a commitment to societal value, and those that do so frame that 
commitment in such a way as to provide questionable legal impact.19 
 
  A revised corporate purpose, as put forth by its proponents, is more likely 
to function as a statement of the corporation’s operational objectives or as a set 
of principles constraining the corporation’s behavior. The challenge then, is to 
understand how such a statement fits within the existing framework of corporate 
law.  First, does corporate law compel that corporations be operated with the 
primary objective of producing economic value for shareholders or is a 
corporation free to adopt an alternative corporate purpose?  Second, how does a 
corporation decide what its purpose is, and who gets to make that decision?  
Third, what legal effect does a corporation’s statement of purpose have?  And 
finally, why might a statement of purpose be useful? 
 
  We note that these questions are all independent of the question that 
underpins much of the current debate over corporate purpose: the normative 
question of what a corporation’s purpose should be – that is, the debate between 
shareholder primacy and some broader notion of societal value.20  They are also 
independent of a range of process questions.  One critical such question is 
whether shareholder profit maximization norm operates as a default such that, 
in the absence of an effective articulation of corporate purpose, a corporation 
should be operated with the goal of pursuing economic value for shareholders.  
A second is, to the extent that a corporation can and does identify its purpose, 
can that purpose be changed and how? 
 
  We believe that careful attention to these questions and the issues that 
they raise about the structure and use of the corporate form are critical to 
evaluating the existing debate and determining corporate purpose.  Our starting 
point, in Part I, is the history of formal corporate purpose as articulated in the 
corporate charter.  We show that the idea of corporate purpose is one of accident 
– a product of historical forces rather than intention.  In other words, the idea 
that corporations should have a corporate purpose of profit maximization, let 
 
appraisal rights when a traditional corporation converts to a benefit corporation.  D.G.C.L. § 
363(b)) (appraisal rights available if a corporation amends its charter to convert from a 
corporation to a public benefit corporation or a public benefit corporation changes its 
purpose).  This type of charter amendment would appear to raise the same issues and 
concerns leading to the applicability of appraisal rights in such an instance.  
19 See infra Part [] and accompanying text.  
20 See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 181 
(2014) (highlighting that corporate law scholars differ both on the positive question of what 
is a permissible corporate purpose and the normative question about what corporate purpose 
should be). 
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alone shareholder primacy is not one that has ever been explicitly reflected in 
the black letter law. And statutes have never required that corporations articulate 
or adhere to a purpose of profit maximization or shareholder primacy.  We then 
consider in Part II arguments that a corporation is legally required to pursue 
shareholder value, and we reach the conclusion that there is limited support for 
this premise.  At a minimum, we argue that the mutability of the corporate 
charter and the flexibility of the business judgment rule give corporate managers 
ample decision to consider stakeholder and societal interests.   
 
  In Part III we consider theoretical justifications for a corporate purpose.  
We explore the economic rationale for shareholder primacy and find it lacking.  
We analyze and reject the claim, grounded in the personhood theory of the 
corporation, that the corporation has ethical, moral or social obligations that 
generate an entity-level purpose independent of the objectives of its 
constituencies.21  In Part IV we consider and reject the argument that an 
articulation of corporate purpose in broader or more socially-oriented terms is 
likely to affect managers’ operational choices.  We argue that the highly-touted 
promises of a commitment to societal value are largely vague and aspirational. 
At the same time, we question the extent to which attention to stakeholder 
interests is inconsistent with the economic mission of the corporate enterprise.  
 
  That conclusion, however, does not lead us to reject the value of 
corporate purpose.  Instead, in Part V we offer a new understanding of the debate 
over corporate purpose grounded in the instrumental nature of the corporate 
form itself.  We argue that, as currently framed, the extensive debate over 
corporate purpose does not adequately reflect the nature of the corporation as a 
collective enterprise.  Corporations involve a variety of corporate constituencies 
– including the corporation’s officers, directors, shareholders, creditors, 
employees, customers and suppliers – each of which, through different 
mechanisms, has a stake in making a claim with respect to the corporation’s 
priorities.  We argue that corporate purpose manages these expectancy interests.  
Corporate purpose can serve to signal a corporation’s priorities and to enable 
constituencies to determine their willingness to engage with the corporation 
based on the degree to which they share those priorities.  Corporate purpose 
articulates the metrics by which managers are to be held accountable.   
 
  Finally, an articulated corporate purpose informs stakeholders as to the 
degree to which they must seek alternative mechanisms to protect their claims 
through contract or regulation.  Notably, our instrumental account views 
corporate purpose as a mechanism to provide coherence, transparency and 
coordination of corporate decisions.  We conclude, however, that the rationale 
 
21 See, e.g., Gregory Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American 
Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987) (discussing conception of corporation as a person). 
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for corporate purpose is not, as a general matter, to operate as a legal constraint.22  
Rather traditional contract and governance mechanisms enable corporate 
participants to hold managers accountable for adhering to the corporation’s 
articulated purpose.   
 
  Having provided an instrumental justification for corporate purpose, we 
consider on a preliminary basis the extent to which this justification informs our 
analysis of the positive question – what is a corporation’s purpose, at least in the 
absence of a formal articulation?  We argue that our instrumental view of the 
corporation brings a new perspective to the debate and conclude that, as a default 
matter, the purpose of a corporation should be understood as maximizing the 
economic value of the firm.  We argue that this default is the only position that 
adequately protects existing expectancy interests.  We stress that a focus on 
economic value does not imply indifference to the interests of non-shareholder 
stakeholders; indeed, we maintain that, in pursuing long term economic value, 
corporate managers are not merely permitted but compelled to consider the 
effect of the corporation’s operations on stakeholders and society at large.     We 
leave for future work the normative questions of whether a corporation can or 
should modify this default as well as the pragmatic question of how it should do 
so.23 
 
  Ultimately, our findings are designed to provide more rigor and a 
framework to the current debate about corporate purpose.  The world is certainly 
in flux, as is the corporation.  But a sustainable and workable vision of the 
corporation requires a theoretical foundation – one which we provide in this 
article and which we will further develop in future work.   
 
I. The History of Corporate Purpose 
   
A. The Accidental Corporate Purpose 
 
  In 16th century England, the mechanism of chartering was responsible 
for the requirement that early corporate firms explicitly specify a purpose.   
Because there was no form of self-chartering available, meaning that a business 
could not secure the right to operate in the corporate form simply by filing a 
 
22 Under our view of corporate purpose, a corporation might commit to prioritize particular 
stakeholder or societal values in its charter, in the same manner as a public benefit 
corporation.  We posit that such a commitment would be legally enforceable in the same 
manner as any other charter provision that limited a corporation’s power or operations.  See 
generally Ofer Elder, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (discussing the use of incentivizes and organization structure for 
corporations to effectively pursue social mission).  
23 See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Can a Corporation Change its Purpose? 
(forthcoming 2021); Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Stakeholder vs. 
Stockholders: Competing Claims for Corporate Purpose (forthcoming 2021). 
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charter, the first English corporate entities were required by law to receive 
Parliamentary sanction for a formation charter.  Prospective firms sought to 
operate in the corporate form for a specified purpose and so by default 
Parliament placed this purpose in their charters.  Notably, the earliest corporate 
charters were not utilized for for-profit businesses but for churches, 
municipalities and universities.24   
 
  By the 17th century, Parliament began to issue corporate charters to 
trading companies.25  Thus, the infamous South Sea Company26 created to 
reduce the British national debt had a monopoly charter on trading in South 
America and the nearby seas (which due to lack of knowledge of geography was 
assumed to be the Pacific South Seas).  Notably, however, the purpose reflected 
in these businesses could be called a public purpose to a very limited extent.  
Although the state’s interests in trade and economic development (and from not 
having to fund that development through public debt) were served by these 
charters, the primary rationale for the corporate form (and its predecessor, the 
joint stock company) was to rationalize the role and interests of private suppliers 
of capital.27   
 
  The practice of requiring corporations to specify a purpose in their 
charters was transferred to America.  Until the late 1800s, chartering was subject 
to state legislative approval.28  A corporation would be formed to operate trains, 
and its corporate purpose legislatively specified in its charter its right to do so.  
During the 1800s, legislative mistrust of corporate entities – a legacy of 
Jeffersonian ideals -- often led to limited grants of authority and purpose for 
commercial corporations.29  In addition, “the size and level of business activity 
had not yet evolved to a point of needing the legal benefits provided by the 
 
24 Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 785, 789.   
25 Id. at 791-92. 
26 The official name of the company was “The Governor and Company of the merchants of 
Great Britain, trading to the South Seas and other parts of America, and for the 
encouragement of fishing”. See L.W. HANSON, CONTEMPORARY PRINTED SOURCES FOR 
BRITISH AND IRISH ECONOMIC HISTORY 1701-1750, at 1712 (Cambridge Press 1963).  
27 See Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Oscar Gelderblom, Joost, Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti, The 
Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 193 (2017).  
28 Early use of the corporate form in the United States was also limited to entities organized 
for a public purpose. See Blair, supra note 24 at 793 n. 47 (citing research by Andrew 
Creighton reporting that prior to the American Revolution, only seven corporations in the 
U.S. colonies were chartered for businesses other than public works, banks or insurance).  
See also ANDREW LAMONT CREIGHTON, THE EMERGENCE OF INCORPORATION AS A LEGAL 
FORM FOR ORGANIZATIONS 39 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University). 
29 NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX AND WILLIAM NOVAK, EDS., CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Press, 2017). 
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corporate form.”30  As a result, most early U.S. corporate charters were issued 
for public purposes – religious organizations, cemeteries and charities.31   
 
  Not only were early corporations required to identify a specific corporate 
purpose in their charters, but the requirement had legal ramifications. State law 
required that corporations confine their operations to the specific purpose 
identified in their charter, and activities outside the scope of that specification 
were beyond the corporation’s legal power or ultra vires.32  Such actions were 
either void ab initio or could be voided at the behest of the shareholders.  The 
ultra vires doctrine served to protect the expectancy interests of the 
corporation’s investors, who understood the enterprise into which their money 
was being placed and the potential risks and rewards associated with that 
enterprise.  The doctrine limited the scope of business discretion afforded to 
corporate management.  Finally, the doctrine protected the public by placing 
limits on the scale and range of corporate operations. 
 
  A classic example of the ultra vires doctrine is the English case of 
Introductions Ltd. v. National Provincial Bank, Ltd.33 In that case the court held 
that it was ultra vires for a company with a purpose to originally provide visiting 
facilities for the Festival of Britain and which subsequently operated a business 
providing deck chairs at a seaside resort to engage in pig breeding. As the court 
put it, “one cannot have an object to do every mortal thing one wants, because 
that is to have no object at all. There was one thing that this company could not 
do and that was to breed pigs.”34 
 
  Similarly in the U.S., the historical application of the doctrine is 
illustrated by U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas v. R.R. Co.,35  in which 
the Court rejected the view that a railroad company had the power to lease its 
property to the plaintiffs in exchange for a receipt of half the plaintiffs’ profits. 
As the court explained: “the powers of corporations organized under legislative 
statutes are such and such only as those statutes confer.”36  The Court noted, in 
particular, that a corporation exercised its powers by virtue of a franchise granted 
by the state, a franchise that was “intended in large measure to be exercised for 
the public good.”37  Engaging in actions beyond those authorized by the 
 
30 Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege To General Utility: A Continuation Of 
Willard Hurst's Study Of Corporations, 49 AM. U.L. REV. 81, 92 (1999). 
31 Id.  
32 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate 
Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 186-87 (1985) (“Before the Civil War...the ultra vires 
doctrine was strictly applied by American courts...By 1930, the ultra vires doctrine was, if 
not dead, substantially eroded in practice...”) 
33 1 All E.R. 887 (1969) 
34 Id.  
35 101 U.S. 71 (1880). 
36 Id. at 82.  
37 Id. at 83. 
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franchise were, in the view of the Court, contrary to “the relations which the 
charter has arranged between the corporation and the community.”38 
 
  This historical view and the legal guardrails of corporate purpose were 
transformed by two developments.  One was the industrial revolution, which led 
to increased demand for the corporate form to facilitate the aggregation of the 
substantial amounts of capital necessary for the growing scale of business 
activity.39  The other, prompted by a growing acceptance that it was appropriate 
to allow the use of the corporate form for general commercial operations, was a 
transition from special charters to general charters which allowed corporations 
to meet the statutory requirement by stating generally that they were intended to 
engage in any lawful purpose or business activity.40  New York adopted a 
broadly available incorporation statute in 1811, and Connecticut followed in 
1837 with a statute that allowed incorporation for any lawful purpose, but the 
general purpose corporation did not take off until 1894 when New Jersey 
transitioned to a self-chartering format which permitted general purpose 
statements.41  Other states, including Delaware followed.42  This legislative 
transition enabled corporations to define their purpose as engaging in any action 
permitted by law.43 Corporations no longer had to adhere to a specific mission, 
one approved by a state legislature.  Instead they could do anything within the 
bounds of the law.   
 
  Today, the ultra vires doctrine has fallen into disrepair.44  In part, 
corporations began to use the doctrine in an opportunistic manner, avoiding 
 
38 Id. at 84. 
39 The origins of the capital markets in the United States grew out of the needs of railroads 
and other types of operations that required large scale capital.  See JOHN STEELE GORDON, 
THE GREAT GAME: THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET AS A WORLD POWER, 1653-2000 76 
(1999) 
40 See Hamill, supra note 30, at 101.  A similar development occurred in England, although 
it was not formalized until the adoption of the 1985 Companies Act. See Stephen J. 
Leacock, The Rise and Fall of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in United States, United Kingdom, 
and Commonwealth Caribbean Corporate Common Law: A Triumph of Experience Over 
Logic, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 67, 81 (2006). 
41 Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. Econ. 
Hist. 677 (1989); 
42 Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 249 (1976). 
43 See R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, A Brief History Of The General 
Corporation Law Of The State Of Delaware And The Amendatory Process in BALOTTI AND 
FINKELSTEIN'S DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (3rd 
Edition, 2020-1 Supplement).  That the scope of corporate purpose can serve a role in 
protecting the expectancy interests of corporate participants is important, however, and a 
point to which we will return shortly. 
44 DGCL § 124 (“No act of a corporation and no conveyance or transfer of real or personal 
property to or by a corporation shall be invalid by reason of the fact that the corporation was 
 
  
112 LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:ppp 
 
obligations to third parties when it was desirable to do so.45  The court and 
statutory response was to limit the remedy available under the doctrine to 
injunctions of the act (to the extent it was not completed) rather than personal 
liability of the officers or directors involved.46  In addition, the transformation 
of corporate charters to provide that a corporation could engage in any lawful 
business, severely limited the scope of actions that could be characterized as 
beyond the scope of a corporation’s power.47  In other words, today the corporate 
purpose of a corporation is frequently unconstrained by charter language that 
allows any action permitted by law.  The consequence is that there is little left 
of corporate action which can be the grounds for an ultra vires action.  
     
B. Modern Purpose Provisions in Charters 
   
 As a result of the developments described in the preceding section, the 
purpose of a corporation, as set out in its charter, has become an unspecified one. 
The modern corporate charter may have a general purpose provision such as that 
in the DowDupont charter described in the introduction48 or a more expansive 
articulation of the scope of the corporation’s operations.  In either case, the 
language of the charter neither operates as a meaningful constraint on the 
corporation’s business activity nor takes a position on the relative importance of 
shareholder versus stakeholder interests. 
 
 Although the vast majority of modern corporations appear to rely on general 
purpose provisions, some provide greater specification.  For example, the 
purpose provision in Pepsico’s corporate charter spans two pages and explains 
that the corporations purposes include, inter alia, manufacturing and distributing 
beverages, acquiring factories, warehouses and stores, acquiring property, and 
 
without capacity or power to do such act or to make or receive such conveyance or transfer,. 
. . .”)  
45 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis Of Corporate 
Illegality (With Notes On How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 
87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1310 (explaining that creditors and suppliers “began to be the victims 
of the doctrine”). 
46 DGCL § 124. 
47 But see, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 45, at 1282 (arguing that ultra vires doctrine can be 
used to make “compliance with the law an enforceable obligation within corporate law”). 
48 See also Philip Morris Articles of Incorporation Article II (“The purpose for which the 
Corporation is organized is the transaction of any or all lawful business not required to be 
specifically stated in these Articles of Incorporation.”) available at 
https://www.pmi.com/resources/docs/default-source/our_company/articles-of-
incorporation.pdf?sfvrsn=dfe2b0b5_0; Tesla Charter Article III (“The nature of the business 
or purposes to be conducted or promoted by the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act 
or activity for which corporations may be organized under the DGCL”) available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1318605/000119312510017054/dex31.htm 
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applying for patents and trademarks.49  Similarly, Ford Motor Company 
incorporated under the name Eastern Holding Company in 1919 has a corporate 
purpose that spans a page and includes the manufacture of automobiles as well 
as airplanes.50  Even these more specific charters avoid specifying a corporate 
purpose akin to that which existed in the early 1800s.  
 
  Notably, however, the typical corporate charter is silent with respect to 
the shareholder/stakeholder/society debate.  It neither identifies a purpose of 
maximizing profit for the benefit of shareholders or otherwise nor articulates a 
broader societal mission.  Indeed, although Salesforce is widely recognized for 
its public statements asserting its commitment to pursue broad societal value, 
the purpose provision in Salesforce’s charter reads: “[t]he purpose of the 
Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a corporation 
may be organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware.”51   
 
  A handful of corporations go further.52  For example, Nestlé, a Swiss 
Corporation, has the following articulation of purpose in its Articles of 
Association: 
 
Article 2 Purpose  
 
1 The purpose of Nestlé is to participate in industrial, service, 
commercial and financial enterprises in Switzerland and abroad, in 
particular in the food, nutrition, health, wellness and related industries.  
 
2 Nestlé may itself establish such undertakings or participate in, finance 
and promote the development of undertakings already in existence.  
 
 
49 See Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Pepsico Inc., Art. 4, available at 
https://www.pepsico.com/docs/album/corporate-
governance/amendedandrestatedarticlesofincorporation.pdf?sfvrsn=e84ce4e_12 
50 See Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Ford Motor Company, Art. Third, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/000003799601000014/0000037996-01-
000014-0002.txt 
51 See Amended And Restated Certificate of Incorporation of 
Salesforce.Com, Inc., Art. Third, available at https://sec.report/Document/0001193125-04-
065496/dex32.htm 
52 We note that in Hobby Lobby, the US Supreme Court quoted Hobby Lobby’s statement 
of purpose as “[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company in a manner 
consistent with Biblical principles.”  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 
682, 703 The Court did not specify how this statement was incorporated into the company’s 
governing documents or address the question of whether it was legally binding.   
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3 Nestlé may enter into any transaction which the business purpose may 
entail. Nestlé shall, in pursuing its business purpose, aim for long-term, 
sustainable value creation.53 
   
  The language about long-term sustainable value creation was added 
through amendments adopted in 2008 and supported by 99% of shareholders.54 
Novo Nordisk a Danish company, states on its website that it is “one of only 
four companies in the world who have incorporated our philosophy into our 
company bylaws. As a result, the three pillars of TBL – Social Impact, 
Environmental Responsibility, and Financial Performance inform everything we 
do and guide every decision we make.”55 Novo Nordisk’s actual governing 
document is more modest.  Its articles of association state that: 
 
The Company’s objects are to carry out research and development and 
to manufacture and commercialize pharmaceutical, medical and 
technical products and services as well as any other activity related 
thereto as determined by the Board of Directors. The Company strives 
to conduct its activities in a financially, environmentally, and socially 
responsible way.56 
  
  Notably, these articulations are incredibly vague.  They do not forswear 
the pursuit of shareholder economic value, even if it comes at the expense of 
stakeholder or societal interests.  Nor do they reflect actual commitments, other 
than commitments to striving for sustainability.  Significantly, Philip Morris 
International, which manufactures cigarettes and is hardly the poster child for 
pursuing long term societal value, for example, makes the same commitment, 
albeit not in its charter.57  On its website, the company explains that “[w]e strive 
to continuously improve the sustainability of our business and to contribute to 
 
53 Articles of Association of Nestlé S.A., available at 
https://www.nestle.com/sites/default/files/asset-
library/documents/library/documents/corporate_governance/articles-of-association-of-
nestle-en.pdf 
54 See Nestlé: Articles Of Association To Be Thoroughly Amended, ETHOS, available at  
https://ethosfund.ch/en/news/nestle-articles-of-association-to-be-thoroughly-amended (last 
accessed Feb. 26, 2020); David Frick, Refocusing Governance on Value Creation, ICGN 
Yearbook 2018.  
55 https://www.novonordisk-us.com/whoweare/about-novo-nordisk/triple-bottom-
line.htmlSee Novo Nordisk, Triple Bottom Line, available at  (last accessed Feb. 20, 2020).  
56 See Articles of Association of Novo Nordisk A/S, available at 
https://www.novonordisk.com/content/dam/Denmark/HQ/aboutus/documents/corporate-
governance/articles-of-association-novo-nordisk.pdf (last accessed Feb. 20, 2020).  
57 The charter provides that: “The purpose for which the Corporation is organized is the 
transaction of any or all lawful business not required to be specifically stated in these 
Articles of Incorporation.”  Philip Morris International Inc. Amended and Restated Articles 
of Incorporation, Article I, available at  
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1413329/000119312508023093/dex31.htm (last 
accessed Feb. 20, 2020).  
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the global sustainability agenda.”58 To date, it is unclear how the statement in 
Nestlé’s charter has affected its operations or is any different than the broad, 
enabling statements of corporate purpose. Nor is it clear how these statements, 
in a charter or elsewhere, would be legally enforced.  
 
  Furthermore, we see no indication that the purpose movement 
contemplates an effort to revise corporate charters even along the lines of Nestlé 
or Novo Nordisk, either to incorporate aspirational sustainability language or 
more concrete objectives such as gender equality, environmental responsibility 
or restraint in the production and sale of hazardous products.  To be clear, we 
are not certain that the vague language in these two charters is constraining or 
enforceable in a meaningful way.  However, we believe that more explicit 
charter provisions would be valid methods of constraining corporate operations, 
consistent with the historical role of the corporate purpose provision as 
managing the expectations of a corporation’s constituencies (as well as the state 
and the general public). The question then is, in the absence of such language, 
how should we understand the purpose of a corporation that is formed to engage 
in any lawful business?  We turn to that question in the next Part.   
 
II. Purpose and Shareholder Primacy 
 
  As the use of the corporation shifted to private commercial enterprises, 
the conception of corporate purpose in terms of shareholder economic value 
solidified. Despite the fact that neither value maximization nor shareholder 
primacy has ever been articulated as statutory requirements, a few courts began 
to incorporate these concepts into corporate purpose.59  As early as 1901, one 
court observed that “[t]he real object and purpose of a corporation for profit is 
to make a profit and to make dividends for the stockholders, and a person who 
holds the stock of a company has a right to have the business of the company 
conducted, as far as practicable at least, so that it will make profits and pay 
dividends.”60  
 
  The view that corporations should be managed with the objective of 
maximizing shareholder economic value found perhaps its most explicit 
articulation in the seminal 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford.61  In Dodge v. Ford, the 
Michigan Supreme Court held that a corporation’s purpose was to maximize 
shareholder profit.  More specifically, the court in that case stated “[a] business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
 
58 Philip Morris International, Reporting on Sustainability, available at 
https://www.pmi.com/sustainability/sustainability-report (last accessed Feb. 20, 2020). 
59 See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
163, 169 (2008). 
60 Arbuckle v. Woolson Spice Co., 1901 WL 708, at *2 (Ohio Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 1901). 
61 204 Mich. 459 (MI 1919). 
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stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”62  
The case, which is widely discussed by commentators (but not widely cited by 
courts)63 forms the central foundation of the argument that the purpose of the 
for-profit corporation is to maximize value for shareholders.64  In the wake of 
Dodge v. Ford there have been a few other non-Delaware cases which have 
addressed the issue, but none as specifically as Dodge.  The most notable of 
these is Shlensky v. Wrigley which upheld the decision of a board of directors to 
refuse to install night lights at the stadium for the Chicago Cubs citing the 
holding of Dodge and the discretion afforded directors to act in “the best 
interests of the corporation and the stockholders.”65 
 
  This argument is buttressed by Delaware case law from the 1980s 
involving mergers and acquisitions.  In Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.,66 the court held that a board facing a change of control was 
required to obtain the “highest price for the benefit of the stockholders.”67  
Revlon explicitly rejected the argument that, at least in the context of a case sale, 
a corporate board could prioritize the interests of a non-shareholder constituency 
(noteholders) over the interests of the shareholders.   
 
  Revlon is widely cited for the principle that a board’s sole duty is to 
maximize economic value for shareholders regardless of the impact of its 
decision on non-shareholder constituencies.  However, reading Revlon to 
incorporate a broad requirement of shareholder primacy into Delaware takeover 
law may be overly expansive.  In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,68 the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that when a corporation took defensive action in response 
to a takeover threat, the board must show it had “reasonable grounds for 
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed . . . .”69  
Notably, however, unlike Revlon, Unocal did not explicitly identify 
 
62 Id. at 507. 
63 According to a Westlaw search as of July 26, 2019, the case has been cited only in 71 
opinions in 100 years. 
64 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 141 (2d ed. 2009) (“It is well-settled 
that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.”) (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a 
Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 776 (2015) (“Dodge v. 
Ford and eBay are hornbook law because they make clear that if a fiduciary admits that he is 
treating an interest other than stockholder wealth as an end in itself, rather than an 
instrument to stockholder wealth, he is committing a breach of fiduciary duty.”).  See 
generally David B. Guenther, The Strange Case Of The Missing Doctrine And The “Odd 
Exercise” Of Ebay: Why Exactly Must Corporations Maximize Profits To Shareholders?,  
12 VIRG. L & BUS. REV. 427 (2018).  
65 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. 1968). 
66 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
67 Id. at 182. 
68 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
69 Id. at 955. 
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shareholders as the only constituency relevant to the board’s assessment.  
Instead, the court described the board’s obligation as evaluating the effect of the 
takeover bid “on the corporate enterprise.”70  The court went on to explain that 
the board’s analysis could include, inter alia, “the impact on "constituencies" 
other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even 
the community generally).”71 
 
  Similarly, in the later case of Time v. Paramount,72 the Delaware 
Supreme Court provided more equivocal guidance on the importance of 
shareholder primacy.73  As with Revlon, the court emphasized that the board’s 
obligation in the takeover context ran to shareholders.  In addition, the court 
described this obligation in terms of economic value, explaining that the board’s 
“mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action, 
including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability.”74  The Court 
qualified this mandate however by noting that the board is “not under any per se 
duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a 
takeover.”  In addition, the Court noted, without criticism, that the primary 
objective of Time’s outside directors, in pursuing a transaction with Warner 
rather than Paramount, was to preserve Time’s culture, more specifically “the 
editorial integrity and journalistic focus” of Time.   
 
   Beyond this handful of takeover cases in Delaware and non-takeover 
cases outside Delaware, support for the claim that corporate law requires 
shareholder value maximization has come largely from academic discourse.  In 
the 1930s, Professors Berle and Dodd debated this point in the Harvard Law 
Review.75 Dodd argued that corporations should be run to serve the public 
interest, believing that corporate managers, if they did so, would “use their 
corporations to resolve the economic and social problems of the Great 
Depression.”76  Although Berle’s position is commonly characterized as 
defending shareholder primacy, Professors Bratton & Wachter read Berle as 
sympathizing with Dodd in terms of corporate purpose but viewing a more 
 
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. Sup. 1990). 
73 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark 16 A.3d 1, 32 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(describing Time decision as the court’s “muted embrace” of the board’s effort “to protect a 
specific corporate culture”); id. at 33 (“Promoting, protecting, or pursuing non-stockholder 
considerations must lead at some point to value for stockholders”). 
74 Paramount Communications, Inc., 571 A.2 at 1150 (emphasis added). 
75 See Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARVARD L. REC. 1148 
(1932) (asserting that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of the 
corporation . . .[are]at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of the shareholders.”; 
E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARVARD L. REV. 
1932) (arguing that the corporation is an “economic institution which has a social service as 
well as a profit-making function”).  
76 Id. at []. 
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confined objective of maximizing shareholder value as necessary to limit 
managerial agency costs.77   
 
  The shareholder primacy component of Berle’s argument gained 
considerable traction in the post-war era.  In 1970, Milton Friedman famously 
argued that corporations should focus on maximizing profits and that any 
conflicting social goal was illegitimate and inefficient.78 A host of corporate 
leaders and academics embraced Friedman’s arguments.79  This was reinforced 
by the 1997 statement of the Business Roundtable that “the paramount duty of 
management and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders.”80    
 
  We question, as have other commentators, whether the handful of cases 
and academic debate provide a sound legal foundation for the claim that 
corporations are obligated to focus on maximizing shareholder value.81  Dodge 
and Shlensky are old cases and neither involves a Delaware court applying 
Delaware corporate law.  More significantly, Revlon, Unocal and Time all arose 
in the specialized takeover context.  Takeover decisions differ from traditional 
operational decisions for a number of reasons including last period problems and 
questions about the scope of authority delegated to the board.  As such, takeover 
law provides a variety of distinctive legal rules including heighted fiduciary 
duties, greater disclosure obligations and enhanced shareholder decision-making 
and exit rights, that are not present in day-to-day corporate decisions.  In 
addition, Delaware’s approach to takeover differs from that of other states, many 
of which have explicitly declined to follow Unocal, Revlon or both. Even if the 
Delaware case law is properly understood as conveying a strong commitment to 
shareholder primacy in the takeover context, we question its relevance to the 
day-to-day operational decisions that are the focus of the current purpose debate.  
 
 
77 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: 
Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 99, 146-47 (2008).  
78 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. 32 (Sept. 13, 1970) (theorizing that the only “social responsibility of business 
is to increase its profits”) 
79 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 15-22 (1991); HENRY G. MANNE & HENRY C. WALLICH, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A 
Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 
441, 449-51 (2001); Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the 
Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 9, 11 (1999); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom 
Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1996); 
Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113 
(1987). 
80 The Business Roundtable, Statement on Corporate Governance (1997), available at 
http://www.ralphgomory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Business-Roundtable-1997.pdf 
81 See Stout, supra note 59.  
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  Perhaps the most difficult case to understand from the perspective of 
corporate purpose is eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark.82  In eBay, the 
Delaware Chancery Court applied the Unocal test to assess craigslist’s adoption 
of a poison pill against its own shareholder, eBay and found that it exceeded the 
board’s authority.83  The Court did so by criticizing the grounds the craigslist 
board asserted to justify invocation of the poison pill, namely that eBay was 
attempting to force the company to earn more profit.84  The Court rejected this 
argument however stating that “[t]he corporate form in which craigslist operates, 
however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not 
when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their 
investment.”85   
 
  Although this language, like that in Time, appears to contemplate that a 
corporation’s purpose will include profit maximization, it neither characterizes 
profit maximization as the exclusive objective nor evaluates a corporation’s 
potential tradeoff between the interests of shareholders and those of other 
constituencies.  Instead, eBay can be understood as a limitation on the ability of 
controlling shareholders to pursue their idiosyncratic objectives at the expense 
of minority shareholders, a concern that fits better within the duty of loyalty 
framework than within the scope of corporate purpose.86 More broadly, the 
court’s decision was limited to prohibiting craigslist from implementing a 
poison pill,87 a decision that, again, is based on the special context of corporate 
takeovers.  The decision does not conclude that the craigslist board acted 
improperly by “providing a website for online classifieds that is largely devoid 
of monetized elements” and in fact, the court observes that the craigslist 
founders and controlling shareholders are “perfectly able to ensure the 
continuation of craigslist’s ‘culture’ so long as they remain majority 
stockholders.”88  
 
  A further concern is that all these decisions can arguably be understood 
as implicating the duty of loyalty rather than the duty of care.  As Professor Lynn 
Stout has observed, Dodge v. Ford is perhaps better understood not for the 
 
82 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).  
83 Id. at 28. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 34.  
86 See id. at 34 (observing that the craigslist founders were acting “because of their own 
personal preferences”). 
87 Id at 34 (“I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights Plan a 
corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the 
economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders”) 
(emphasis added). 
88 Id.  We view the eBay case as consistent with the Delaware court’s longstanding holdings 
that fiduciaries cannot take inequitable conduct.  The court in eBay cited the case of Schnell 
v. Chris–Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del.1971) for this proposition. eBay, 16 
A.3d at 39.  
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premise that corporations have a duty to prefer shareholder interests to those of 
other stakeholders but for the principle that controlling shareholders have a duty 
“not to oppress minority shareholders.”89   Similarly, as Professor Zachery 
Gubler explains, an “animating principle” behind Revlon and the other Delaware 
takeover cases is regulating inherent conflicts of interest.  This principle is based 
on the concern that conflicts of interest are both ubiquitous in takeover cases and 
that in the takeover context the costs of inadequately policed conflicts are 
particularly high.90   
 
  The argument that these cases are about managerial loyalty rather than 
shareholder primacy is reinforced by recent developments in the Delaware 
courts’ Caremark jurisprudence.  The Caremark doctrine requires a board to 
undertake a good faith effort to “’to exercise oversight’ and to monitor the 
corporation's operational viability, legal compliance, and financial 
performance.”91 Although Caremark duties were originally articulated as a 
component of the duty of care,92 the Delaware courts subsequently explained 
that the fiduciary duty violated by a lack of director oversight is, instead, the 
duty of loyalty.93 
 
  At the same time, recent Delaware decisions have suggested that 
insufficient attention to stakeholder interests may itself be legally actionable.  In 
Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to grant a motion to 
dismiss a Caremark claim that Blue Bell ice cream’s board failed to implement 
a board level food safety program despite the presence of both “red” and 
“yellow” flags.94  The Court specifically highlighted the importance of customer 
interests to Blue Bell’s continued operational success.  The Court stated in this 
regard that “[a]s a monoline company that makes a single product—ice cream—
Blue Bell can only thrive if its consumers enjoyed its products and were 
confident that its products were safe to eat.”95 
 
 
89 Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 163, 
168 (2008) 
90 Zachery J. Gubler, What’s the Deal with Revlon? (working paper, draft dated Feb. 24, 
2020). 
91 Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019) citing Stone v Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 
364 (Del. 2006). 
92 See, e.g., Peter D. Bordonaro, Comment, Good Faith: Set In Stone?, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1119, 
1135 (2008) ("Caremark liability was originally based on a violation of the duty of care"). 
93 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“It follows that because a showing of 
bad faith conduct, in the sense described in Disney and Caremark, is essential to establish 
director oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of 
loyalty.”). 
94 Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, at 809. 
95 Id.  
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  In the wake of Marchand there has been an uptick in Caremark claims 
in the Delaware courts.96  There has also been a renewed focus by corporations 
on risk assessment and compliance.97   While Caremark claims and the renewed 
interest in them do not directly raise purpose claims, they highlight the 
importance of a board’s attention to ESG considerations rather than merely short 
term profit maximization, particularly in regulated industries.98     
 
  Our analysis of the extent to which shareholder primacy is legally 
required has focused largely on Delaware law.  Outside Delaware, the situation 
is more complicated.  First, in the Hobby Lobby decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court explicitly read the statutory right of a corporation to be organized for any 
lawful purpose as providing corporations with the legal authority to further 
humanitarian objectives, at least in addition to economic value.  As the Court 
explained:  
 
Each American jurisdiction today either expressly or by 
implication authorizes corporations to be formed under its 
general corporation act  While it is certainly true that a central 
objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern 
corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue  
profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do 
so.99 
 
 To be sure, the Hobby Lobby decision was based in part on the fact that 
a corporation had such a small number of shareholders that its idiosyncratic  
purpose was discernable and expressed.  Nonetheless, Hobby Lobby appears to 
stand for the proposition that a corporation can have an alternative purpose, 
 
96 See, e.g., In re Clovis Oncology, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (Del Ch. 2019) (refusing to 
dismiss Caremark claim when complaint alleged board ignored “red flags that Clovis was 
not adhering to the clinical trial protocols, thereby placing FDA approval of the drug in 
jeopardy.”) 
97 See, e.g., Cleary Gottlieb, Not So Sweet: Delaware Supreme Court Revives Caremark 
Claim, Provides Guidance on Directors’ Oversight Duties, Jun 24, 2019 (outlining 
procedures board’s should take in the wake of the Marchand decision), available at 
https://www.clearymawatch.com/2019/06/not-so-sweet-delaware-supreme-court-revives-
caremark-claim-provides-guidance-on-directors-oversight-duties/#_ftn2 (last accessed Feb. 
27, 2020). 
98 See John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Robert B. Greco, In re Clovis: Considering 
Caremark Claims after Marchand, 22 INSIGHTS (11), at 3 (Nov. 2019) (“The Clovis opinion 
signals that, post-Marchand, the Delaware courts, in assessing Caremark claims at the 
pleading stage, may hold boards operating in highly regulated industries to a somewhat 
elevated standard for monitoring and assessing compliance with mission-critical regulatory 
regimes.”) 
99 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770-2771 (citations omitted). 
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albeit one determined by the shareholders themselves, providing that purpose 
can be ascertained.100  
 
 Second, a majority of U.S. states have adopted so-called constituency 
statutes that expressly authorize corporate officials to consider a range of 
stakeholder interests in addition to shareholder interests.101  An example is the 
Wisconsin Constituency statute which provides that, in discharging their duties, 
corporate officers and directors may consider the effect of their actions on 
“employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation”, “the communities in 
which the corporation operates,” and “[a]ny other factors that the director or 
officer considers pertinent.”102 These statutes were adopted in the 1980s and 
were principally designed to address takeovers.103  Some specifically apply only 
in the case of takeovers.104 Delaware has not adopted such a statute, but some 
Delaware corporations have adopted equivalent positions in their charters.105  
We are unaware of any Delaware case exploring the validity or legal significance 
of such a charter provision. 
 
 In no case though do these statutes specify how corporate 
decisionmakers are to weigh or prioritize the interests of different constituencies, 
though their text clearly authorizes corporate decisions that do not focus 
exclusively on maximizing economic value for shareholders.106  Nonetheless, 
 
100 Notably, the Court did not identify the formal manner in which Hobby Lobby articulated 
or committed to its purpose.  
101 See Matt D. Cain, Stephen McKeon & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Do Takeover Laws 
Matter? Evidence from 50 Years of Hostile Takeovers, 124(3) J. FIN. ECON. 464 (2017) 
(documenting the adoption of constituency laws); Christopher Geczy, et al. Institutional 
Investing When Shareholders are not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 95 (2015) 
(reporting that 33 states currently have constituency statutes). 
102 Wis. §180.0827.  
103 See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and 
Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 399 
(1993) (“The legislative history clearly shows that the Pennsylvania legislature designed the 
statute with takeovers in mind.”) 
104 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp.1995) (applying 
constituency statute in the context of a takeover, consolidation or a sale of all or 
substantially all of the corporation's assets). 
105 See, e.g., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the McClatchy Corp., Art. V (“In the 
consideration and approval of all policies and actions of the Corporation, the Board of 
Directors shall have the right to consider all relevant factors which are in the best interests 
of the Corporation and its stockholders, including and in addition to the financial interests of 
stockholders, community standards and values, the welfare of employees, and the quality 
and independence of the Corporation and its publishing enterprise.”), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1056087/000119312506154574/dex31.htm.  See 
also Ofer Eldar, The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 92, 189 (2017) (discussing the use of charter provisions for companies to pursue social 
purpose).  
106 See generally Debow & Lee, supra note 103, at 403 (discussing the role of shareholder 
interests in constituency statutes).  
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both the Hobby Lobby case and constituency statutes provide some support for 
the claim that shareholder primacy is not legally compelled, at least as a matter 
of positive law.107 
 
III. Theories of Corporate Purpose 
 
  Having concluded that there is questionable support for any particular 
corporate purpose as a matter of positive law, we explore in this section theories 
of the corporation and the extent to which they provide guidance in identifying 
a particular corporate purpose.  We first examine economic theories of the 
corporation; we then turn to personhood theories of the corporation.  We 
conclude that neither of these theories in and of themselves provide a rationale 
for a corporation having a purpose.  
 
A. Economic Theory and Corporate Purpose 
 
 For many years, economic theory has defended shareholder primacy on 
normative grounds, as the most efficient operating principle.  The argument 
reasons that, because shareholders are the residual claimants in a corporation,108 
maximizing shareholder value has the effect of maximizing firm value.109  This 
argument directly supports shareholder primacy but as a means, not an end in 
that the ultimate economic objective is maximizing the value of the firm itself. 
Under a utilitarian perspective and, assuming no negative externalities, 
maximizing firm value is consistent with maximizing social welfare.110 
 
 Three subsidiary efficiency considerations apply.  First, shareholder 
economic value is a particularly transparent metric, especially in the context of 
public corporations in which it can be measured, albeit perhaps imperfectly and 
noisily, by observing stock prices.  Second, there are reasons to think that 
shareholder interests are “largely unitary” in the sense that “[m]anagers 
maximizing the wealth of shareholders as a group generally help all shareholders 
 
107 See also Geczy et al., supra note 101, at 115 (arguing that constituency statutes “signal a 
change in the law” and “expand director authority). 
108 See Del. Gen Corp. L. § 281 (providing for distribution of all remaining assets of a 
dissolved corporation to its shareholders). 
109 See, e.g., Michael Jensen, Value Maximization and the Corporate Objective Function, 
dated Jan. 2, 2000 ("200 years' worth of work in economics and finance indicate that social 
welfare is maximized when all firms in an economy attempt to maximize their own total 
firm value."), available at https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/00-
058_f2896ba9-f272-40ca-aa8d-a7645f43a3a9.pdf. 
110 See Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 62 (1996) (“Therefore, maximizing the present value of the 
corporation's earnings stream maximizes the total value of the corporation and, thus, 
maximizes the corporation's contribution to social wealth”). 
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pro rata.”111  Third, because corporate law vests shareholders with some 
decision-making authority, through their power to elect directors and vote on 
certain structural issues such as mergers and bylaw and charter amendments, 
shareholders have legal powers by which to hold officers and directors 
accountable.112  
 
 More specifically, maximizing shareholder value as an overall operating 
principle need not dictate allocational issues.  At least some of those who 
advocate shareholder primacy do so not out of a normative conviction that 
shareholder interests should dominate but out of the expectation that 
shareholders as governing agents will maximize profits, resulting in value 
creation for all firm stakeholders.113 But this is largely a governance argument, 
not one which mandates how boards of directors should operate the firm. 
 
  Scholars have also offered a number of challenges to the economic 
rationale for shareholder primacy.  First, modern commentators typically reject 
the view that shareholders are the sole residual claimants in the firm.114  
Importantly, to the extent that other stakeholders are not fully protected by 
contract, regulation or otherwise, maximizing shareholder value may result in 
transfers to shareholders from those other claimants rather than increasing 
overall firm value.115  Other commentators have attacked the norm as creating 
wealth destroying externalities.116  Moreover, the principle itself has been 
attacked head-on for creating short-termism in corporations.117  In this regard, 
scholars have noted that shareholders themselves have heterogenous interests, 
 
111 Henry T.C. Hu & Lay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to 
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1352 (2007). 
112 See Rock, supra note 7 (arguing that corporations have a purpose to maximize 
shareholder profits in part due to the structure of Delaware law which provides shareholders 
structural control over the corporation.  These attributes are likely overstated.  For example, 
non-shareholder stakeholders can control corporate decisions by contract and can use 
contractual remedies to hold decisionmakers accountable.  See Penn/NYU paper on 
environmental covenants in lending agreements.   
113 See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 533, 537-38 (2006).   
114 See Amir Licht, The Maximands Of Corporate Governance: A Theory Of Values And 
Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 652 (2004) (“The traditional law and economics 
perspective holds that in determining the maximands of the corporation, exclusive priority 
should be given to its residual claimants. . . .This position, however, does not, in reality, 
hold true.”) 
115 See Van Der Weide, supra note 110, at 522; Lee, supra note 113, at 565.  See also 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 769 (2006). 
116 See generally Lee, supra note 113, at 539-562 (discussing academic arguments that 
shareholder primacy creates wealth-destroying externalities). 
117 See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1275, 1284 (2002) 
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making it difficult to decide exactly to whom, among a group of shareholders, 
directors and the firm should cater.118 
 
 More problematically, even if shareholder value is correlated with firm 
value, the shareholder primacy view can be challenged by recognizing that, as a 
practical matter, some societal interests will not fall within the contours of the 
firm.  To the extent that maximizing shareholder (or firm) value sacrifices these 
interests, that operating policy creates negative externalities.  Economic theory 
does not supply an answer to the normative question of how corporate law or 
individual operational decisions should weigh these costs, but any broad-based 
efficiency theory must grapple with them. 
 
 Ultimately, we conclude that the debate over the economic foundations 
of the firm  appears secondary to the fundamental issue at hand which is whether 
corporations should have a purpose. These theories instead take corporate 
purpose as a given and debate over how the firm should operate based on an 
economic theory of the firm.  These theories do not at the end of the day do more 
than this by establishing a definitive belief – without legislative decision as to 
its superiority as a policy matter – that shareholder primacy or another ends 
should be that purpose.  Ultimately, economic theory in these instances can 
provide an orientation for purpose, at best.  But more commonly these theories 
provide a governance principle implying a corporate purpose without first 
establishing purpose.  We thus need to look elsewhere if we are going to find a 
foundational basis for corporate purpose.   
 
B.  Personhood and Corporate Purpose 
 
 Commentators have looked to personhood theory and, in particular, the 
view that a corporation is a person and thereby has the obligations associated 
with personhood to identify a basis for corporate purpose.  Notably, the 
personhood theory differs from economic theory in that it tends to be used to 
justify a corporate purpose that is altruistic or concerned with increasing societal 
welfare. Characterizing a corporation as a person opens the door to attributing 
to corporations the moral and ethical duties of regular people.119 The corporate 
 
118 See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1255, 1283 (2008) (investors may not share “a common economic goal”); Martin 
Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733,744-46 
(2007); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 561, 579-93 (2006) (describing conflicting shareholder interests). 
119 See, e.g., Susannah Ripkin, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional 
Approach To The Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 117 
(2009) (“If the corporation is a real person in society, it should have the same sorts of moral 
and social responsibilities that individuals have. As a citizen of a larger community, it 
enjoys certain rights and privileges, but it should also bear the corresponding duties of a 
citizen ‘to be sensitive to the impact of its activities on others, including not just its 
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social responsibility movement120 was premised on the position that economic 
entities have moral obligations and offered various rationales for these 
obligations.121   
 
  The personhood theory of the corporation is articulated most frequently 
in connection with cases concerning the legal rights of the corporation.  In a 
series of decisions in the 1800s the Supreme Court granted a variety of legal 
protections to corporations, including the right to sue and be sued, due process 
rights and contract rights.122  More recently, the Supreme Court considered the 
political and religious rights of corporations. Thus, in Citizens United v Federal 
Election Commission,123 the court revisited its 1970s decisions on political 
donations and found that corporations had rights to expression underlaid by their 
associational status.124 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,125 the Supreme 
Court held that corporations could have religious rights under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act.126 
 
 Although some scholars draw upon these cases for the principle that a 
corporation should be recognized as a legal person to attribute to the corporation 
moral or ethical obligations of personhood, such a reading misconstrues the 
rationale behind the decisions.127  The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in these 
cases does not extend constitutional rights on the basis that corporations are like 
natural persons but instead relies on the provision of rights to corporations in the 
service of protecting shareholder individuals.128  As Professor Elizabeth Pollman 
has argued, “the so-called doctrine of corporate personhood does not provide 
guidance for determining the scope of corporate rights.”129 It instead is a theory 
of the expression of these rights, based on an associational view of the 
corporation.  
 
investors, but also employees, creditors, consumers, and the larger society in which it 
operates.’”). These arguments rely on the claim that individual persons have particular 
moral and social responsibilities, an issue that we do not address here. 
120 See, e.g., John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: 
Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1 
(2005) (chronicling development of CSR movement). 
121 See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation To International Law: Disclosure 
Systems, Markets And The Regulation Of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 
591, 606 (2008). 
122 See Stephen Winkler, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR 
CIVIL RIGHTS (Liveright 2018).  
123 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
124 Id. at 389-90 (Scalia, J., Concurring) (arguing that First Amendment protections apply to 
the speech of artificial legal entities). 
125 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
126 Id. at 719. 
127 See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 785 (2013). 
128 Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 51 (2014). 
129 Id. 
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 The personhood theory could still serve as the basis for corporate purpose 
that is grounded in the purpose of individual corporate participants.  The 
challenge with this approach is, as we discuss further below, corporations are 
comprised of a variety of stakeholders with widely varying objectives.  Even if 
the inquiry is limited to shareholders, a corporation’s shareholders vary as to 
their timeframe, their liquidity needs, their tax situation as well as the ESG issues 
that they consider important and their willingness to prioritize those interests 
over economic value.130  Personhood theory can serve as a basis for imputing a 
corporate purpose only under the misguided assumption that shareholders either 
have homogenous interests or that the tools of corporate decision-making such 
as majority shareholder voting or delegation to corporate directors are a basis 
for resolving intra-shareholder differences, an issue that we consider in further 
detail below.  
 
 More broadly, even if a corporation were to have the legal or ethical 
obligations of a natural person, imputing such obligations provides little 
guidance in identifying a particular corporate purpose.  Natural persons have a 
wide variety of purposes, objectives and self-imposed constraints on their 
pursuit of those objectives.  These constraint may be social, moral, ethical, 
political, religious or philosophical in origin.  There is widespread disagreement 
on the appropriate scope of these constraints and therefore on what constitutes 
ethical behavior even among individuals.  Thus personhood theory is not capable 
either of answering the question of whether a corporation should have a purpose 
or, if so, what that purpose should be. 
 
 If neither the shareholder primacy argument or the personhood theory 
provides a foundation for corporate purpose, what then is its rationale?  In the 
next Part we examine current forward-looking theories of corporate governance 
and purpose in order to examine if these establish a theoretical framework for 
corporate purpose.   
 
IV. Corporate Purpose as an Operational Constraint 
 
 In this Part we explore another potential source of purpose  corporate 
purpose statements which seek to guide and/or constrain the scope of officer and 
director decision-making authority.  In large part, this is the primary focus of 
corporate actors in the current purpose debate.  We thus examine in this Part the 
 
130 See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 118.  See also Stephen Bainbridge, The Implications 
of Investor Ideology for Delaware's Shareholder Ratification Doctrine, 
ProfessorBainbridge.com (July 11, 2018), available at 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2018/07/the-implications-of-
investor-ideology-for-delawares-shareholder-ratification-doctrine.html (noting that investors 
have heterogenous preferences and accordingly questioning the message sent by a 
shareholder vote). 
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extent to which corporate purpose statements, which do not take the form of 
charter, bylaw or contractual provisions, are likely to influence operational 
decisions and provide a basis for corporate purpose.   
 
A. Corporate Purpose Statements   
 
 As noted in the introduction, corporate purpose statements largely follow the 
pattern of the Business Roundtable statement.131  The Business Roundtable 
statement reads more fully:  
 
While each of our individual companies serves its own corporate 
purpose, we share a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders. 
We commit to: 
 
Delivering value to our customers. We will further the tradition 
of American companies leading the way in meeting or 
exceeding customer expectations. 
 
Investing in our employees. This starts with compensating 
them fairly and providing important benefits. It also includes 
supporting them through training and education that help 
develop new skills for a rapidly changing world. We foster 
diversity and inclusion, dignity and respect. 
 
Dealing fairly and ethically with our suppliers. We are 
dedicated to serving as good partners to the other companies, 
large and small, that help us meet our missions. 
 
Supporting the communities in which we work. We respect the 
people in our communities and protect the environment by 
embracing sustainable practices across our businesses. 
 
Generating long-term value for shareholders, who provide the 
capital that allows companies to invest, grow and innovate. We 
are committed to transparency and effective engagement with 
shareholders. 
 
 
131 For purposes of this discussion, we assume that the Business Roundtable Statement is 
intended as a true statement of intentionality by its signatories.  We note that others have 
characterized the statement as “largely a rhetorical public relations move”, a 
characterization that we neither accept nor reject here.  See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 
2, at 3. 
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Each of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver 
value to all of them, for the future success of our companies, 
our communities and our country.132 
 
The Business Roundtable statement responds to the concern that the 
arguments for shareholder primacy that we describe above have unduly 
influenced the behavior of corporate decisionmakers. Whether or not these 
claims are sound, commentators reason that corporate officials are likely to 
accept them and therefore to focus on shareholder value and, even more 
problematically, on short term stock price, in making operational decisions.133  
We note that the rationale for corporate purpose described in this section is 
premised on the normative foundation that corporations should place greater 
weight on non-shareholder interests in their operating decisions.  For purposes 
of this section, we accept that proposition as a given, while noting that a theory 
of corporate purpose need not identify any particular objective as normatively 
preferable. 
 
 A statement of corporate purpose thus could serve as an instruction, a 
signal or a legally binding mandate to corporate officers to temper that focus 
and, in operating the firm, to consider the long term sustainability of the firm, 
the economic and non-economic interests of non-shareholders and broader 
societal interests.  It thus seeks to impose some form of operational constraint 
and direction on the corporate board.  As this paragraph suggests, a theory of 
corporate purpose as an operational constraint comingles several of the 
conceptual distinctions that we highlighted in our introduction.  The following 
table attempts to distinguish among the relevant animating principles:134 
 
  
 
132 See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT, supra note 4. 
133 See supra notes []-[] and accompanying text.  
134 A number of commentators have highlighted the fact that defenses of stakeholder value 
are often unclear about the extent to which consideration of stakeholder interests is intended 
as a means to promote shareholder value or an end in itself.  See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, 
supra note 2, at 3 (describing these as “two different versions of stakeholderism”); Adam B. 
Badawi & Frank Partnoy, ESG and Litigation:  Is there a Relationship between Being 
“Bad” and Getting Sued?, working paper (2020), draft at 9 (explaining that ESG metrics 
can be understood as “capturing ways in which a focus on ESG is consistent with 
maximizing shareholder returns” or alternatively “measur[ing] deviations from shareholder 
returns that inure to the benefit of stakeholders”).  While we agree with this characterization, 
we argue that it captures only half the story. 
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 Long-Term 
Shareholder Value 
Purpose 
Long Term Stakeholder 
Value Purpose 
Legal Obligation Legal mandate to 
consider non-shareholder 
interests but only to the 
extent they promote long 
term shareholder value 
Legal mandate to 
consider non-shareholder 
interests irrespective of 
their effect on long term 
shareholder value 
Legal 
Consideration 
Power but not obligation 
to consider non-
shareholder interests but 
only to the extent they 
promote long term 
shareholder value 
Power but not obligation 
to consider non-
shareholder interests 
irrespective of their effect 
on long term shareholder 
value 
 
  As the table suggests, corporate purpose can have positive legal bite in 
the sense that it creates some obligation for corporate decisionmakers to consider 
particular interests or objectives in operational decisions, or it can be merely 
aspirational.  Existing constituency statutes are examples of the latter in that they 
authorize but do not compel corporate officials to consider non-shareholder 
constituencies in the takeover context and, depending upon the statute, in other 
decisions.  In addition, a theory of corporate purpose could both identify 
particular objectives as normatively desirable and privilege those objectives over 
alternatives.  Traditional shareholder primacy privileges the interests of 
shareholder over those of other stakeholders.   
 
  Let us consider options presented by the table.  It is somewhat unclear 
how the boxes in red and green change the corporation’s purpose from 
shareholder primacy or add to the traditional constraints imposed by fiduciary 
principles.  Presumably if the duty of corporate officials is to focus primarily on 
maximizing shareholder value, and a consideration of stakeholder interests 
contributes to shareholder value, then properly-informed corporate officials will 
do so and they will do so regardless of whether the consideration of such 
interests constitutes a distinct obligation.  In addition, given the latitude afforded 
by the business judgment rule, it is difficult to expect these approaches to effect 
a meaningful change in corporate operations.  We note in particular that the 
business judgment rule, particularly in the operational context, affords officers 
and directors broad discretion.  In the overwhelming majority of cases, attention 
to stakeholder and societal interests can rationally be defended as consistent with 
the pursuit of long term shareholder value, and existing fiduciary principles.  
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  Indeed, to the extent that ESG and shareholder interests are consistent 
with maximizing shareholder value, a claim supported in some measure (though 
not entirely) by empirical studies,135 it would appear that corporate officials 
would be remiss if they failed to take those interests into account.  As such, a 
case can be made that the approach set out in red box is required by existing law, 
and mild support for such a view can be found in cases like Marchand.136 
 
  The brown and blue boxes indicate an attempt at an affirmative shift 
away from shareholder primacy and, perhaps, a modification of the scope of 
existing fiduciary obligations.  The brown box – “Power but not obligation to 
consider non-shareholder interests irrespective of their effect on long term 
shareholder value” --   presents a formulation of corporate purpose that is, we 
think, most consistent with the view espoused by purpose advocates and is 
embodied in the Business Roundtable statement.  It takes the position that the 
consideration of stakeholder interests is normatively desirable and legally 
permissible when those interests are unrelated to or even inconsistent with 
shareholder value but that this consideration is not mandatory.  It further takes 
the view that consideration of stakeholder interests may but need not trump 
shareholder interests or the pursuit of economic value.   
 
  As noted above, we are skeptical of the claim that existing corporate law 
imposes a binding obligation of shareholder primacy, at least outside the context 
of takeovers and self-dealing transactions, although we note that the position in 
these boxes is in tension with some of the cases we discuss in Part III supra, 
particularly the eBay decision.  As noted in Part III, however, existing black 
letter law authorizes corporate officials, at least in some cases, to consider non-
shareholder interests regardless of whether those interests have a relationship to 
firm value.  Many state statutes explicitly authorize charitable donations, for 
example, irrespective of their relationship to firm economic value.137  Similarly, 
 
135 See inter alia Joshua D. Margolis, Hillary Anger Elfenbein & James P. Walsh, Does It 
Pay to Be Good… and Does It Matter? A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Corporate Social and Financial Performance (March 1, 2009), available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1866371 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1866371; Philipp 
Krüger, Corporate Goodness and Shareholder Wealth, J. FIN. ECON. (2015); Karl V. Lins, 
Henri Servaes, and Ane Tamayo. Social Capital, Trust, and Firm Performance: The Value 
of Corporate Social 
Responsibility During the Financial Crisis, J. OF FIN. (2017); Brandon Boze, et al., The 
Business Case for ESG (May 23, 2019). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford 
University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance 
No. CGRP-77, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393082. 
136 See supra notes []-[] and accompany text.  
137 Every state corporate law statute authorizes corporations to make charitable donations 
and none limits such donations to those that increases firm value.  See R. Franklin Balotti & 
James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable Contributions by 
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constituency statutes empower but do not compel corporate officials to consider 
stakeholder interests without a requirement that those interests be aligned with 
shareholder interests.138  Accordingly, we believe there is at least an arguable 
basis for believing that the theory of corporate purpose reflected in the brown 
box is consistent with existing law. 
 
  There are two substantial challenges  with the brown box, however.  One 
is the lack of enforceability.  Unless corporate officials are compelled to consider 
and even to prioritize non-shareholder interests, there is little reason to believe 
they will do so.139  As noted in Section III.A above, corporate law relies 
primarily on shareholder-based mechanisms such as capital markets pricing and 
director elections to hold managers accountable.  This system is not immutable. 
Corporate law could be revised, as per Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposal or 
the two-tiered board structure used in Germany to require labor representation 
on corporate boards, thereby increasing manager accountability to workers.140  
Executive compensation could be structured in a way that creates incentives for 
managers to pursue identified stakeholder or societal objectives such as reducing 
a company’s carbon footprint.141  And stakeholders could impose constraints by 
contract, such as provisions in a credit agreement that restrict pollution.142   
 
 In this regard, we note the availability of alternative forms which do have 
structures to accommodate singular constituencies, or alternative ones:  the non-
profit.  The Sierra Club’s original purpose, for example, as set forth in its articles 
of incorporation was “[t]o explore, enjoy and render accessible the mountain 
regions of the Pacific Coast . . . .”143  This purpose was legally enforceable and 
 
Corporations, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 970 (1999) (“These statutes are generally unrestrictive as 
to amount of the contribution and its beneficiaries”).  In six states, including New York and 
California, the statutes explicitly authorize such donations “irrespective of corporate 
benefit.”.  Id. at 971. 
138 Indeed, several constituency statutes explicitly provide that no particular interest, 
including that of the shareholders, “is to be considered ‘dominant’ or ‘controlling.’”  Eric 
Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes., 61 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 14, 73-74 (1992) (citing statutes of Iowa, Indiana and Pennsylvania). 
139 See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 2. 
140 See generally Rudolf Buschmann, Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining in 
Germany, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 26 (1993); Carol Rasnic, Germany's Statutory Works 
Councils and Employee Codetermination: A Model for the United States?, 14 LOY. L.A. 
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 275 (1992). 
141 See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 2 (providing evidence that corporate signatories to 
the BRT statement are not seeking to align management compensation with stakeholder 
interests through their compensation structures). 
142 See Michael Ohlrogge, Bankruptcy Claim Dischargeability and Public Externalities: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, working paper dated Feb. 14, 2020 at 52-53 
(describing credit agreements imposing environmental constraints on borrowers such as 
inspections or insurance). 
143 Sierra Club, Articles of Incorporation (Original Version), dated June 4, 1892, available at 
https://www.sierraclub.org/articles-incorporation 
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involved an environmental interest.144  The stakeholders of the Sierra Club were 
its members, but the board of directors was and is self-elected, replacing itself.  
To the extent there is an enforcement mechanism of the Sierra Club’s mission it 
comes from the California State Attorney General which acts as an oversight 
mechanism for the Sierra Club.145  But even then the well-known slack in 
charitable compensation and mission creep for non-profits creates inefficiencies 
that this enforcement mechanism is not suitable for.146  
 
  A more significant problem is determining when a particular operational 
decision involves a sacrifice of shareholder value in the interests of other 
stakeholders.  Some commentators have argued that such trade-offs are 
ubiquitous.147  We disagree.  Indeed, for the reasons that Professor Dorothy Lund 
has identified, we believe that a variety of considerations affect the relationship 
between stakeholder interests and shareholder value and that these 
considerations are often unknown and unknowable to a corporate manager at the 
time of an initial decision.148  These considerations include the effect of a 
stakeholder-oriented decision on a corporation’s reputation and subsequent 
sales, the possibility that competitors will adopt similar policies, resulting in a 
level playing field, the prospect of averting more burdensome obligations 
imposed through regulation, the possible changes in supply chain practices, and 
more.  As a result, a range of business decisions that might appear to sacrifice 
 
144 Compare this to the current purpose which is akin to the statements of corporate purpose 
in for-profit charters.  It reads in full:   
 
[t]he purposes of the Sierra Club are to explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places 
of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earth's ecosystems 
and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of 
the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these 
objectives.” 
 
Sierra Club, Sixth Version: Complete restatement of Articles of Incorporation, (June 20, 
1981), available at https://www.sierraclub.org/articles-incorporation (last accessed Feb. 27, 
2020).  
145 The Sierra Club is organized as a non-profit corporation under the laws of the state of 
California and as such is subject to oversight by the state attorney general.  See California 
Non-Profit Corporation Law § 5250.    
146 See generally James J. Fishman, The Nonprofit Sector: Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y. CITY 
L. REV. 303 (2006). 
147 See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 2, at 19 (“potential trade-offs between shareholders 
and stakeholders are ubiquitous”).   
148 See Lund, supra note 12 (describing potential effects of one company’s socially 
responsible decisions on its competitors, suppliers and the market as a whole).  Melvin 
Eisenberg observed more than twenty years ago that seemingly purely altruistic corporate 
behavior might nonetheless provide a benefit to the corporation. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
Corporate Conduct that Does Not Maximize Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical 
Conduct, the Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner's Dilemma, Sheep's Clothing, 
Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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short term profitability may be rationally related to long term corporate value 
and, as a result, within the scope of managerial discretion afforded by the 
business judgment rule. 
 
  Consider the earlier example of Dick’s Sporting Goods decision to stop 
selling guns in some of its stores following the school shooting in Parkland, 
Florida.149  Initially, the media characterized the decision to ban some gun sales 
as “at the expense of revenue.”150  Dick’s CEO Edward Stack believed the 
company would lose a quarter of a billion dollars from the decision.151 Dick’s 
also faced the prospect of boycotts and protests from gun owners.152 Stack 
defended the decision as the right thing to do, and was quoted as saying “I don’t 
really care what the financial implication is.”153  In hindsight, however, the 
tension between societal and shareholder value is less clear.  Sales grew at the 
stores where the company discontinued gun sales, and Dick’s removed guns 
from more stores.154   A year after its initial announcement, Dick reported a jump 
in same-store sales, and its stock price increased by more than 4 percent.155 In 
March 2020, Dick’s announced that it would remove guns from an additional 
440 stores, and its stock price increased by 13%.156 
 
  The characterization in the blue box, which seems to be the position 
espoused in the Davos Manifesto, is similarly problematic, but raises additional 
concerns. The principal concern is that we find no support for the blue box in 
positive law.  State corporation statutes could impose an obligation on 
corporations to act in the public interest – indeed, public benefit corporations 
 
149 See Nathaniel Meyersohn, Dick’s Sporting Goods removes Guns and Ammo from 125 
Stores, CNN BUSINESS, Mar. 14, 2019.   
150 Sarah Nassauer, How Dick’s Sporting Goods Decided to Change Its Gun Policy, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 4, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-dicks-sporting-goods-decided-to-
change-its-gun-policy-1543955262 
151 Terry Nguyen, Dick’s Sporting Goods destroyed $5 million worth of guns it pulled from 
its stores, Vox, Oct. 8, 2019.  Not only did Dick’s stop selling the guns, it destroyed more 
than $5 million worth of guns in its inventory rather than returning the weapons to the 
manufacturers.  Id. 
152 See, e.g., Rich Duprey, Gun sales: Will Dick's Sporting Goods be hurt by a gun owners' 
boycott?, THE MOTLEY FOOL, May 17, 2018, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/retail/2018/05/17/dicks-sporting-goods-hurt-by-
gun-owners-boycott/34999931/; Rachel Siegel, Dick’s Sporting Goods reports strong 
earnings as it experiments with reducing gun sales,  Wash. Post, Aug. 22, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/22/dicks-sporting-goods-stock-surges-
strong-nd-quarter-earnings/ (reporting that the decision sparked customer boycotts and 
employee resignations). 
153 Nassauer, supra note 150. 
154 Meyersohn, supra note 149. 
155 Siegel, supra note 152. 
156 Dick’s Sporting Goods To Stop Selling Guns At 440 Additional Stores, CBS Pittsburgh, 
Mar. 10, 2020, https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2020/03/10/dicks-sporting-goods-440-store-
gun-sales/ 
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adopt this approach – but there does not appear to be any basis for inferring such 
an obligation from the language of general corporation statutes or existing case 
law.157  We believe (contrary to the view of some scholars), 158 that current law 
allows corporations voluntarily to commit in their charters to prioritize 
stakeholder or societal interests, and that such commitments would be legally 
enforceable, but we have found no examples of corporations that have done so, 
and, as we observed above, the corporate purpose movement does not seem to 
be advocating the widescale amendment of corporate charters.  The few existing 
corporate charters that contain a more expansive formulation of corporate 
purpose seem to be deliberately structured so as to limit their potential as legal 
constraints, for example, by stating that a corporation will “strive” to act in a 
sustainable manner. 
 
  Notably, although we observe that the blue box, unlike the three others, 
has the potential to impose a meaningful constraint on corporate operations, 
thereby offering the potential to address operational externalities and regulatory 
failures,159 it is nonetheless problematic.  For example, the approach reflected in 
the blue box, would seemingly provide a basis for requiring Dick’s Sporting 
Goods to stop selling guns even if gun sales were profitable or compelling 
energy companies to reduce their investment in oil and gas production.160   
 
  But how would this be structured?  If Dick’s had the obligation to 
consider or even prioritize stakeholder interests, which interests would it 
consider?  Should it prioritize the interests of its customers who want to buy 
guns or those who favor a ban?  Should it prefer the interests of local 
communities in reducing the likelihood of school shootings or consider the 
interests of its employees who object to the ban?  This is akin to a corporate 
constituency statute without definition.  Moreover, we note that, despite Ed 
Slack’s statement that Dick’s made its decision to reduce gun sales without 
regard to its financial effect, no shareholder has challenged Dick’s decision, and 
we are skeptical that any shareholder could do so successfully.  It is thus 
questionable whether, even if the statement in the blue box reflects a change 
from positive law, it would effectuate a change in corporate practice.   
 
 
 
157 Whether amending state corporation statutes to mandate such an approach, we leave for 
future work. 
158 See Rock, supra note 7. 
159 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733 (2005). 
160 Professor Madison Condon offers such an example, involving decisions by Exxon and 
Chevron to curtail production with a resulting negative impact on the firms’ profitability and 
share price.  See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner at 35 (April 26, 
2019). WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, Forthcoming; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper 
No. 19-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3378783 
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B. The Proper Positioning of Purpose Statements 
 
  The foregoing analysis questions both claims that recent affirmations of 
social responsibility constitute shifts in corporate purpose and that they commit 
corporations to anything beyond the scope of their legally-enforceable 
obligations.  While a corporation could align itself with a stakeholder or societal 
objective that imposes additional constraints on its operations, even within the 
framework of shareholder value maximization, purpose statements neither 
empower other stakeholders nor constrain managerial discretion.   For example, 
a purpose statement concerning worker constituencies and worker 
representation on the board may result in higher wages and benefits for the 
represented workers, but it does not compel such a result.  Indeed, workers’ 
interests would arguably be better served by providing these terms through a 
traditional employment contract.    
 
  The primary reason for this is that a corporate purpose statement, unlike 
a traditional contract or a regulation (such as a minimum wage law), lacks an 
enforcement mechanism, either in legal form or as a structural form of the 
company.161  Moreover, the malleability of such a purpose statement increases 
the enforcement challenge. This does not mean that the statement could not 
result in the reallocation of resources among corporate constituencies.  To be 
sure, we believe it is likely to have such an effect.  But purpose statements do 
not, by themselves, either change corporate operations.     
 
  This view is consistent with observed practice.  The Business Roundtable 
statement, in its own words, “supersedes” the Roundtable’s prior commitment 
to shareholder primacy in favor of a “commitment to a free market economy that 
serves all Americans.”162  These signatories included the CEOs of Amazon, 
Cigna, and Chevron, each of whom now professes a commitment to pursue 
societal value.163  Without taking a position on overall extent to which these 
 
161 It is for this reason, among others, that we believe that issues regarding risk and 
externalities of the corporate form should not be dealt through corporate purpose but rather 
regulation of the company.  The issues and judgements involved in such an assessment are 
better situated to be dealt with through legislation, the administration process and even 
courts such as through the Caremark line of cases.  But see Steven L. Schwarcz 
Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2016) 
(arguing that systemically important firms should have a “public governance duty”).  
162 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT, supra note 4. 
163 See, e.g., Cigna Company Profile, available at https://www.cigna.com/about-
us/company-profile/ (“dedicated to improving the health, well-being, and peace of mind of 
those we serve.”) (last accessed Feb. 26, 2020). Amazon’s mission statement is “We strive 
to offer our customers the lowest possible prices, the best available selection, and the utmost 
convenience.” Amazon.com Inc.’s Mission Statement & Vision Statement (An Analysis), 
PANMORE INSTIT., dated Feb. 13, 2019, available at http://panmore.com/amazon-com-inc-
vision-statement-mission-statement-analysis.  Chevron’s “vision” is “to be the global energy 
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companies are committed to stakeholder or societal welfare, it is worth 
observing that each has been subject to extensive criticism on precisely this 
point.  Amazon has been criticized for taking advantage of loopholes to pay a 
miniscule amount of federal income taxes.164   Cigna has been criticized for 
bribing insurance brokers with luxury vacations to sway their recommendations 
to the employer-providers they advise.165  And according to one source, 
Chevron’s ESG rating puts it exactly in the middle of companies in the 
extraction industry.166 
 
 Perhaps the most robust statement along these lines is that recently issued 
by Airbnb.  In 2018, the company released a statement in which it asserted that 
it wanted to be “a 21st-century company with two defining characteristics: We 
will have an infinite time horizon. We will serve all of our stakeholders.”167 On 
January 17, 2020, the company issued a second statement identifying five 
stakeholders “Guests,” “Hosts,” “Communities,” “Shareholders” and 
“Employees.”168  The company then put forth principles to follow for each of 
these such as “We prioritize the safety of our community” for “Guests.” Airbnb 
also released metrics reporting on its success in pursuing these objectives such 
as “Number of personal safety incidents . . . .”169   
 
 
company most admired for its people, partnership and performance” The Chevron Way, 
available at https://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/chevronwayenglish.pdf (last accessed 
Feb. 26, 2020). 
164 From 0% to 1.2%: Amazon Lauds Its Minuscule Effective Federal Income Tax Rate, 
INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY, Jan. 31, 2020, available at 
https://itep.org/from-0-to-1-2-amazon-lauds-its-minuscule-effective-federal-income-tax-
rate/ (last accessed Feb. 26, 2020).  
165 See Behind The Scenes, Health Insurers Use Cash And Gifts To Sway Which Benefits 
Employers Choose, PROPUBLICA,  https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/behind-scenes-
health-insurers-use-cash-and-gifts-sway-which-benefits-employers-choose (last accessed 
Feb. 26, 2020).  
166 Chevron Corp. CSR / ESG Ranking, CSRHUB, available at  
https://www.csrhub.com/CSR_and_sustainability_information/Chevron-Corp (last accessed 
Feb. 26, 2020).  
167 Open Letter to the Airbnb Community About Building a 21st Century Company, Jan. 25, 
2018, available at https://news.airbnb.com/brian-cheskys-open-letter-to-the-airbnb-
community-about-building-a-21st-century-company/ 
168 An Update on Our Work to Serve All Stakeholders, Jan. 17, 2020, available at 
https://news.airbnb.com/serving-all-stakeholders/. 
169 Id. Along similar lines Shell, an oil company, has a compensation scheme which is 
designed to incentive executives to reduce carbon emissions by the company (but not 
presumably its product). See Radhakrishnan Gopalan, John Horn and Todd Milbourn, Shell 
is tying executive pay to carbon emissions. Here's why it could create real impact, CNN 
BUSINESS, Dec. 14, 2018, available at https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/14/perspectives/shell-
executive-pay-carbon-
emissions/index.html?utm_medium=social&utm_term=image&utm_source=twCNN&utm_
content=2018-12-15T04%3A46%3A03 
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  What then does it mean for these CEOs to pledge their commitment to 
social value or for a company to pledge to be run for its stakeholders?  A cynical 
view would characterize the statements as virtue-signaling, designed either as 
marketing tools or to reduce the firm’s political exposure or vulnerability to 
regulation.170  Alternatively, we could view a corporation’s articulation of its 
purpose in the terms set out in the brown box as something akin to a corporate 
New Year’s resolution – the corporation’s identification of an area in which, 
according to some baseline set of normative principles, it hopes to do better and 
an expression of its desire to do so.  A company may even, like Airbnb, attempt 
to set employee compensation in accord with these principles.  Unfortunately, 
the analogy is likely to prove true in the sense that, absent some form of legal 
compulsion, a corporation’s commitment to pursue societal value rather than 
shareholder interests is, like a New Year’s resolution, easily broken.171   
 
  In sum, our analysis suggests that existing statements of corporate 
purpose are largely aspirational rather than legally binding or constraining.  As 
such, we question the potential for these statements to affect the purpose of the 
corporation in any meaningful way.  Moreover, even if they do have an effect 
on corporate behavior through compensation or otherwise they do not  establish 
a raison d’ etre for corporate purpose.  Instead, they put forth vague goals and 
principles that appear to jibe with the business purpose of the company. For 
example, Airbnb has an interest in ensuring that its guests are safe. Is this a 
corporate purpose or simply a sound business practice?  It may result in a 
reallocation of resources towards visitor safety, but it does not appear to be 
possible to separate the two principles.   
 
  Arguably the same observation applies to corporate constituency 
statutes.  These statutes purport to reposition the corporate purpose by allowing 
boards to consider other constituencies in decision-making involving takeovers.  
Yet, there is no guidance on how these constituencies should be considered.172  
More importantly, there is no evidence that these statutes have actually led to 
any changed outcomes in takeovers where they primarily purport to comply.  
Instead, the bulk of the commentary has noted that these statutes are akin to 
corporate purpose statements which provide negotiating leverage to boards but 
have no legal foundation.173 Constituency statutes themselves thus also do not 
 
170 Such motivations could potentially serve to promote long term shareholder value, taking 
us from the brown box to the green box. 
171 Studies show that New Year’s resolutions have a failure rate of 80%, and most are 
broken by February. See Marla Tabaka, Most People Fail to Achieve Their New Year's 
Resolution. For Success, Choose a Word of the Year Instead, INC., Jan. 7, 2019, available at  
https://www.inc.com/marla-tabaka/why-set-yourself-up-for-failure-ditch-new-years-
resolution-do-this-instead.html (last accessed Feb. 26, 2020).  
172 See supra note [] and accompanying text.  
173 See Brian Quinn, Constituency Provisions and Intermediate Scrutiny Outside of 
Delaware, M&A LAW PROF BLOG, Nov. 23, 2009, available at 
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provide a purpose but instead seek, perhaps unsuccessfully, to channel corporate 
behavior.  
 
  Ultimately, this discussion leads to the conclusion that not only do these 
corporate purpose statements lack constraint they lack foundation.  More 
specifically, their inherent uncertainty and vagueness means that they are not 
equivalent to the legally enforceable corporate purpose statements of the 1800s 
requiring a corporation to build canals but not breed pigs.  They thus do not 
provide a reason for corporate purpose nor do they provide a corporate purpose 
itself.  If we are to identify a rationale for corporate purpose, we must thus look 
elsewhere.  
 
V. An Instrumentalist View of Corporate Purpose 
 
 The foregoing discussion suggests that we are corporate purpose 
skeptics. To an extent, we are.  We do not believe that corporate purpose is a 
tool that can be used to compel corporations to act as benevolent social planners.  
Nor do we think that, by pledging their commitment to the Business Roundtable 
statement, corporate CEOs will change their behavior and pay workers higher 
wages, reduce their carbon footprint or stop manufacturing and selling 
hazardous products.   
 
  We do, however, believe that there is a justification for corporate 
purpose.  We argue in this Part V that corporate purpose has an instrumental 
value in articulating and managing the expectancy interests of its constituents.  
Because a corporation is a collective enterprise, individuals and entities that 
interact with it and made decisions on its behalf have different interests and 
goals.  Corporate purpose allows a corporation to signal its priorities to its 
constituents, enabling them both to sort – identifying interactions that are likely 
to further their individual goals -- and to negotiate – determining the regulatory 
or contractual protections necessary to constrain corporate decisions that are 
inconsistent with those goals.   
 
  The instrumental justification does not provide a normative basis by 
which to select a specific corporate purpose or to resolve the shareholder versus 
stakeholder debate.  As we noted above, however, few existing corporations 
have adopted a statement of purpose, at least in a format that we view as legally 
enforceable let alone definite.  We therefore go on to consider the question of 
what we should understand a corporation’s purpose should be, as a positive 
 
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2009/11/unocal-duties-outside-of-delaware.html 
(last accessed Feb. 26, 2020).  See also Martijn Cremers, Scott Guernsey and Simone M. 
Sepe, Stakeholder Orientation and Firm Value (December 27, 2019), available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3299889 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3299889 (finding that 
states with constituency statutes “result in significant increases in shareholder value, 
especially in more innovative firms and those with stronger stakeholder relationships.”) 
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matter, in the absence of such a statement.  We term this a “default” purpose and 
argue that, for the reasons developed in this Part, a corporation’s default purpose 
should be pursuing economic value primarily for the benefit of the firm.  We 
leave for future work both the question of whether this purpose is normatively 
desirable and the procedure by which a corporation could modify the default.174 
 
A. Corporate Purpose as Managing Expectancy Interests 
 
  Our starting point is to recognize that the corporation is a collective 
enterprise.  A multiplicity of individuals and entities interact with the 
corporation, and each corporate constituency has plausible claims with respect 
to how the corporation is run – employees seek to maximize their wages and 
improve their working conditions, customers want a low cost and high quality 
product, creditors want repayment of their loans with minimal risk. Second, 
individuals within each constituency group may have different goals or interests.  
Some shareholder prefer short term profit maximization; others favor the 
creation of long term sustainable value.  Some customers prioritize cost while 
others care about product quality.  Some employees prefer the potential rewards 
of fast-paced corporate growth, while others care about long term job stability.   
 
  The modern contractual theory of the corporation recognizes that the 
terms of the corporate contract enable each of its participants to seek its 
objectives and to coordinate those efforts with those of other participants.175  The 
nexus of contracts theory argues that a corporation consists of a series of 
contracts that serve to accommodate these interests.176  We argue that corporate 
purpose can serve as an implicit term within these contracts.  As such, it both 
enables corporate participants to have a shared understanding among corporate 
participants about their rights and provides them with clarity about those rights. 
 
 
174 The debate over opt-out versus mandatory rules is a vigorous one in corporate law in part 
based on an economic view of the corporation.  See John C. Coffee, Jr. The 
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1618, 1661-64, 1671-74, 1689 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., Lecture, No Exit?: 
Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 
53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988). For reasons we will delineate in future work we believe that 
a purpose can be modified, provided certain procedures and monitoring functions are in 
place.   
175 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW, ch. 1 (1991); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Antitakeover 
Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 
VA. L. REV. 1257 (1985); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Foreword: The Debate on Contractual 
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1408 (1989); Henry N. Butler, The 
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 99, 110-20 (1990); 
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. 
L. REV. 767 (1989).   
176 See generally David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201. 
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  Notably, these interests need not be purely economic.  As the Supreme 
Court explained in Citizens United, corporations serve as a vehicle for 
associations of citizens to band together, to formulate their views and objectives, 
and to communicate those views.177  These objectives may include expressive, 
humanitarian and altruistic goals.  As the Court explained in Hobby Lobby: 
 
For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a 
wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon 
for such corporations to further humanitarian and other 
altruistic objectives. Many examples come readily to mind. So 
long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take 
costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that 
go beyond what the law requires.178 
 
  Moreover, as Citizens United further recognized, “the procedures of 
corporate democracy” allow corporate participants to coordinate their 
expectations and impose those expectations on corporate decisionmakers.179    
 
  In this light, corporate statements about purpose or values can be 
explained as aligning and regulating stakeholder goals.  Nike’s recent campaign 
with Colin Kaepernick, for example, can be seen as reaching out to its consumer 
base to signal that its values align with its consumers.180 Similarly Ben & Jerry’s 
made a business of pursuing stakeholder values even as a subsidiary of Unilever, 
the giant food conglomerate.181  Indeed Ben & Jerry’s structure within Unilever 
was designed to enable it to retain a separate progressive identify and “[t]o make, 
distribute and sell the finest quality ice cream and euphoric concoctions with a 
continued commitment to incorporating wholesome, natural ingredients and 
promoting business practices that respect the Earth and the Environment.”182 
 
 
177 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010). 
178 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 712 (2014). 
179 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362. 
180 See Joshua Hunt, Colin Kaepernick, Nike, and the Myth of Good and Bad Companies, 
THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 5, 2018 (“For Nike, Kaepernick’s cause is simply good business—if it 
were anything other than a cynical branding exercise, the company would surely not be 
simultaneously doing business with the NFL, which has done its best to stifle Kaepernick’s 
protest movement.”)  
181 See Simon Mainwaring, Purpose At Work: How Ben & Jerry’s Combines Growth And 
Brand Activism, FORBES, dated Feb. 26, 2020 (“In the last six years, our focus has been 
around activism. We’re doing that in the context of being a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Unilever. The actual governance agreement is that Unilever has operational control of our 
business. However, we have an independent board of directors that has legal oversight over 
our social mission and brand equity.”)  
182 Ben & Jerry, Our Values, available at https://www.benjerry.com/values (last accessed 
Feb. 20, 2020).  
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   The foregoing discussion demonstrates two potential congruencies.  
Statements about corporate purpose may attract customers who share that 
purpose, increasing corporate value for shareholders.  In addition, a 
corporation’s articulated purpose of serving customers may attract shareholders 
who value that objective independently of its effect of economic value.  These 
congruencies are not limited to customers and shareholders.  Corporations 
publicly express their values as a method to attract and retain the best talent for 
positions.  In fact corporate managers are open in expressing that many of the 
value positions they take today because they are demanded by millennial and 
socially conscious employees.  Professors Barzuza, Curtis and Weber have 
theorized that much of the social activism by investors is in order to recruit 
socially conscious millennial investors.183   
 
  Purpose then serves two distinct functions.  First, corporate purpose 
allows individuals to identify a corporation’s objectives in order to determine 
the degree of fit between the corporation’s operational goals and their individual 
goals.  It enables shareholders and creditors to contribute capital according to a 
set of terms that governs their rights with respect to that contribution.  It allows 
officers and directors to make operational decisions, protected by settled 
principles of authority and process.  It protects employees with the existence of 
a legally responsible entity that stands behind the decisions of individual 
managers.  It offers customers, suppliers and others who deal with the 
corporation guidance about the history, stability, and financial condition of the 
counterparty to their dealings.  In short, corporate purpose provides a framework 
that allocates the rights and responsibilities of the participants in the collective 
enterprise that constitutes the corporation’s business. foundation. As such, it 
offers a way of managing expectancy interests relevant to the decision whether 
to associate with the corporation.   
 
  Second, purpose enables those who interact with the corporation to 
identify the ways in which the corporation’s purpose may create a tension with 
their individual goals and to navigate that tension by contract.  For example, a 
bank may want to lend money only to businesses that are carbon neutral.  If a 
corporation’s primary purpose is to pursue economic value, it may not make 
costly operational changes that reduce its carbon footprint.  However, the lender 
can both demand those changes through conditions in the loan agreement and 
create incentives through the terms of the loan to induce the corporation’s 
agreement to those conditions. 
 
 Corporate purpose not only sets expectations, it provides  a standard for 
monitoring which can be measured and assessed.  It offers a basis for prioritizing 
 
183 Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund 
Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3439516 
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among competing claims by reducing those claims to a common metric.  For 
example, purpose enables a corporation to weigh interests in the environment 
with concerns about workplace safety. It also provides a basis for evaluating 
corporate decisions and holding corporate decisionmakers accountable.  In part 
we view ESG and the pursuit of metrics to assess compliance with corporate 
ESG goals as a similar attempt to monitor and measure corporate performance 
in line with corporate purpose.184 
 
 In this regard, purpose can be seen as an efficient economic default rule 
that complements rather than expanding the role of fiduciary duties.185  
Corporate purpose provides managers and other stakeholders with a natural 
touchstone by which to measure corporate performance.  Purpose enables 
managers to identify priorities in the management of the firm within the 
discretion afforded to them by the business judgment rule.  It also serves as a 
monitoring function, limiting self-dealing and rent seeking.  Purpose thus serves 
to ensure that the interests of the firm do not need to be renegotiated in each 
iteration.   
 
 Importantly, a variety of individuals interact with corporations, and a 
standardized set of default rules creates efficiencies that guide their expectations 
in the absence of firm-specific tailoring by contract or otherwise.  Purpose as a 
default rule that does not need to be negotiated every time not only sets 
expectations but creates networks of precedent and structure.186   
 
B. Enforceability and Purpose 
 
  If corporate purpose is an implicit term in the corporate contract, the 
question is when and if each of these constituencies can legally enforce that 
purpose.  Legal enforcement was an available mechanism in the 1800s when 
corporate purpose is to provide visiting facilities and not breed pigs.187  But in 
today’s broadly-worded enabling statutes and open-ended corporate charters, the 
existence of purpose and the enforceability of purpose are not necessarily 
aligned.  
 
 
184 See generally Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 
GEORGETOWN L. J.  923 (2019). 
185 See generally Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A 
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1990). See also Tamar 
Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OREGON L. REV. 1209, 1215-1231 (1995) 
(discussing the mandatory versus option nature of fiduciary duties in the corporate context).  
186 There is some empirical support that this instrumental use of corporate purpose is value-
enhancing.  A recent study found that, although corporate purpose was not itself related to 
firm financial performance, firms with a high clarity of purpose had higher stock market 
performance and accounting returns.  Claudine Madras Gartenberg, Andrea Prat & George 
Serafeim, Corporate Purpose and Financial Performance, 30 ORG. SCI. 1 (2019). 
187 See supra notes []-[] and accompanying text.  
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  As an initial matter, we do not think that our theory of corporate purpose 
requires broad-based enforceability.  To the extent that corporate purpose 
informs the expectations of those who deal with the corporation, those 
individuals and entities have market-based tools to correct decisions that depart 
from the articulated purpose.  Customers who are attracted by a corporation’s 
commitment to the welfare of its workers will sanction the corporation’s lack of 
attention to working conditions in its supply chain.  Employees increasingly seek 
corporations with strong environmental and social policies, and corporations 
that do not adhere to their commitments will be unable to retain them.188 Purpose 
thus enables discipline by a variety of market participants, and to the extent that 
purpose extends beyond share price, it expands the role of markets beyond the 
capital markets. 
 
  We also believe that a corporate purpose can be implemented through 
structural and governance mechanisms rather than legal rules.  A corporation 
can both credibly commit to a particular purpose and incentivize its officials to 
act in accordance with that purpose through structural provisions including 
contract terms,189 board composition and the structure of its executive 
compensation.  Indeed, to the extent that a corporation’s purpose today is 
shareholder primacy– this purpose is reinforced by a number of structural and 
governance mechanisms in the corporate form including the right of 
shareholders to elect directors, vote on charter and bylaw amendments and 
approve structural changes.190  This does not mean that as an optional matter 
corporate purpose may be not more specific, but that as a default matter the 
current charter statements are sufficient, and enforcement will come through 
other means.  
 
  In this regard, default legal purpose provides a guidestar and guardrails.  
If a corporation deviates substantially, there can be legal enforcement, and the 
concepts like Revlon, entire fairness review for conflicts of interest and ultra 
 
188 See, e.g., Sustainable Brands, Half of Employees Won't Work for Companies That Don’t 
Have Strong CSR Commitments, June 1, 2016, 
https://sustainablebrands.com/read/organizational-change/half-of-employees-won-t-work-
for-companies-that-don-t-have-strong-csr-commitments (noting that “51 percent [of 
employees] won’t work for a company that doesn’t have strong social or environmental 
commitments” and that retention of highly-transient millennials without such commitments 
is particularly difficult). 
189 For example, We’s S-1 disclosed that Founder Adam Neumann’s voting rights were tied 
to a requirement that he make a billion dollars’ worth of charitable contributions over a 10-
year period.  See Annie Palmer, WeWork CEO Adam Neumann has incentives tied to the 
company’s stock value and his charitable donations, CNBC, Aug. 14, 2019, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/14/wework-ceo-adam-neumann-has-incentives-tied-to-
stock-value-giving.html 
190 See Rock, supra note 7, at []-[] (arguing that the structural nature of the corporation and 
shareholder favorable mechanisms dictate that the purpose of the corporation is to maximize 
the value of the firm for shareholders).  
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vires offer tools to police those outer limits.  But within the guardrails, purpose 
is enforced through market forces, structural and governance mechanisms. 
Although the guardrails of corporate purpose can be very wide so as to limit the 
prospect of legal enforcement, that limit does not undermine its utility.  
 
C. A Value Maximizing Corporate Purpose  
 
 The theory that corporate purpose serves to manage the expectancy 
interests of existing corporate constituencies offers a basis for identify a default 
corporate purpose.  Putting aside for the moment, both the issue of how a 
corporation articulates its purpose and, to the extent it has done so,  how it goes 
about changing that purpose, what should we identify as the purpose of a 
corporation that has made no such explicit choice? 
 
  We note that our analysis has powerful consequences.  Outside the realm 
of close corporations and statutory benefit corporations, we find few 
corporations that have made any effort to articulate a corporate purpose in their 
governing documents.  More importantly, even those corporations that have 
done so, appear to identify objectives that are consistent with maximizing long 
term economic value.   
 
 We argue that the history and structure of the corporation support 
extension of this choice more generally, and that the default view of corporate 
purpose should be understood as maximization of long term economic value.  
There are several reasons for selecting economic value as a default rule.  
Economic value is measurable, transparent and provides a common metric by 
which to evaluate, compare and prioritize competing claims.  In addition, 
economic value provides consistency among corporations.  There is a high cost 
to market participants of evaluating and pricing varying objectives.  Profit 
maximization provides a common goal which reduces the economic costs of the 
firm.   
  
  Moreover, among the potential candidates for corporate purpose, only 
profit maximization serves the goal of reconciling the motivations and interests 
of the various corporate constituencies. It prevents gridlock in that, when the 
interests of two groups conflict, economic value provides a principled basis for 
deciding between those interests.  It also provides a common metric that enables 
corporate constituencies to price and negotiate for protection of their conflicting 
interests.  Perhaps most importantly, profit maximization limits the ability of 
corporate managers to trade off the interests of one group against another 
(consider Revlon and the potential for trading off the interests of shareholders 
vs. employees vs. creditors) and, perhaps more importantly, the ability of 
corporate managers to engage in self-dealing through the guise of promoting 
stakeholder value. 
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  Importantly, corporate purpose is a mechanism for resolving conflict not 
merely between constituencies but also within constituencies.  Indeed the 
corporation as currently constituted is set up to manage these constancies.  
Within any particular corporate constituency, individual members may have 
very different visions of the good.  Trinity Wall Street may want Wal-Mart to 
sacrifice profits in favor of eliminating the sale of guns; a retired NRA member 
may disagree both with the willingness to sacrifice profits and the idea that 
stopping the sale of guns furthers societal interests. 191   
 
 We note that the accountability provided by the purpose of economic 
value is a mixed bag. On the one hand, commentators argue that the pursuit of 
economic value leads managers to focus excessively on stock price and that, in 
turn, promotes short-termism.192  On the other hand, economic value addresses 
the potential that particular large and influential shareholders may seek to pursue 
idiosyncratic social agendas for private reasons or that do not reflect the interests 
of shareholders more generally.  An example may be the efforts by some large 
asset managers such as BlackRock to cause corporations to focus more on 
ESG.193  
 
  It is specifically the role of corporate purpose in addressing intra-
shareholder conflicts that, in our view counsels in favor of economic value rather 
than the claim that corporations should maximize shareholder welfare put forth 
by Professors Hart & Zingales.194  Professors Hart & Zingales claim that 
corporations should incorporate shareholders’ noneconomic preferences such 
that, if shareholders take social values into account, corporations should do so 
as well.  The challenge with this position is that shareholder non-economic 
preferences are fluid, unknowable and incommensurate.  While it is possible to 
think rationally about an individual shareholders’ willingness to trade-off 
between economic and non-economic value, it is impossible to order those 
preferences within a group of shareholders.  As Professor Griffith has observed, 
even if social purposes are favored by some shareholders, they are unlikely to 
be favored by all of them.195  As a result, shareholder wealth maximization may 
serve as a type of “least common denominator,” enabling corporations to make 
operating decisions in the absence of shareholder agreement regarding other 
 
191 This view is of course in direct conflict with recent stewardship initiatives which call 
upon institutional investors to engage in more effective monitoring of their portfolio 
companies not merely to increase profits or to reduce agency costs but to influence the 
social policies of those companies 
192 See Mark J. Roe, Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 71 (2018).  
193 See Larry Fink Letter, https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/2019-larry-fink-
ceo-letter 
194 Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not 
Market Value, 2 J. LAW, FIN. & ACCT’ING 247 (2017) 
195 Sean Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund 
Voting Authority (2019) (working paper at 24). 
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priorities or objectives.196   Similarly framing corporate purpose in terms of 
economic value reduces the prospect that a majority of shareholders may, in 
effect, oppress the minority by imposing their idiosyncratic preferences 
concerning the corporation’s objectives.   
 
  Although we argue here that corporate purpose should, by default, be the 
pursuit of economic value, we recognize that this proposition raises a variety of 
issues in terms of alternatives.  We also recognize that the pursuit of economic 
value is fundamental to much of the corporate governance literature, and that a 
variety of questions from the role of shareholder voting to the appropriate 
composition of the board of directors may need to be rethought under alternative 
conceptions of corporate purpose.  The complexity of these issues provides 
further support for our proposed default purpose and warrant further 
examination in connection with the normative question of what a corporation’s 
purpose should be, a question that we explore in future work 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  The purpose of the corporation is currently a topic of fervent debate.  As 
we highlight in this Article, however, the debate has raged in the absence of any 
theoretical work exploring whether a corporation should even have a purpose.  
We fill this gap.  Although we examine and reject conventional theories of 
corporate purpose, including as well as the claim that corporations are required 
to maximize either shareholder or societal value as a matter of positive law, we 
identify an instrumental value to corporate purpose in mediating among the 
interests and expectancies of  a corporation’s stakeholders.  
 
 Our theory provides needed foundation for arguments over corporate 
purpose.  We argue that, when placed in context, the current arguments that 
corporations can or do have the purpose of maximizing stakeholder or societal 
welfare are rhetorical.  We reject the claim that the principles espoused by the 
Business Roundtable reflect legal constraints and challenge their potential 
impact on operational decisions as no more likely to be effective than New 
Years’ resolutions.    Instead, we offer both a theoretical frame for the existing 
debate and a principled basis for treating value maximization as a default rule. 
By putting forth these theories of corporate purpose we ultimately aim to better 
frame and clarify the debate over whether corporations should have a purpose, 
and if so, what that purpose is.    
 
 
196 Id. 
